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Abstract
Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge
transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with
multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about
valuations. We show that any weighted average of revenue and social welfare can be
maximized through appropriately chosen transaction fees and that in increasingly
thin markets such optimal fees converge to linear fees. Moreover, fees decrease with
competition (or the weight on welfare) and the elasticity of supply but decrease
with the elasticity of demand. Our theoretical predictions fit empirical observations
in several industries with intermediaries.
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1 Introduction
Mechanisms according to which sellers are charged a commission fee or a tax levied on
the transaction price are prevalent in practice. Examples include the indirect taxes im-
posed by governments, percentage fees charged by real-estate and by stock brokers and
commission fees charged by auction houses and sites such as Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and
eBay. Currently, little is known about the effects and determinants of such mechanisms,
which we call fee-setting mechanisms. Fee-setting mechanisms have recently fared promi-
nently in public debates on issues as various as credit-card fees, allegations of collusive
commission fee setting by auction houses and real estate agents, the – at times drastic –
increases of value-added taxes in financially troubled countries, and the introduction of
financial transaction taxes in the European Union.
We study fee-setting mechanisms within an independent private values setup. Pri-
vate information is two-sided insofar as every buyer and every seller is privately informed
about his or her type. Buyers have unit demand and sellers have unit capacities. All
buyers are ex ante symmetric and all sellers are ex ante symmetric in the sense that
their types are independently and identically distributed. The mechanism designer can
be thought of as a private market maker or broker. Alternatively, one can think of a
government providing a trading platform via the legal system and law enforcement. The
primary focus of our analysis is on the market making problem a mechanism designing
intermediary faces whose objective it is to maximize a weighted average of social surplus
and revenue accruing to the market maker. We call mechanisms that achieve this objec-
tive constrained efficient, or optimal. Such a weighted average is of interest both as a
model of imperfect competition between private brokers and as the solution to a Ramsey
pricing problem by a government.1
As to why the services of private intermediaries and governments are useful or nec-
essary, there are a variety of mutually non-exclusive explanations such as for reducing
transaction and search costs, certifying quality, improving matching, building reputa-
1In the world of brokerage, this problem is the analog to the problem of optimal nonlinear pricing
for a regulated monopoly in the tradition of Ramsey; see, for example, Wilson (1993).
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tion, providing infrastructure that facilitates trade, and enforcing contracts.2 Rather
than choosing a specific combination of these explanations, we focus on the problem of
optimal pricing by intermediaries and optimal indirect taxation, taking as given that
governments impose indirect taxes and that buyers and sellers trade via intermediaries.
Our main interest is on thin markets, that is, on environments in which the number
of buyers and sellers is small. The results are easiest to summarize for a bilateral trade
problem with one buyer and one seller, for which the fee-setting mechanism is such that
the intermediary announces a fee that is a function of the transaction price, the seller
observes the fee and sets a take-it-or-leave-it price and the buyer accepts or rejects the
price.3 Our first main result is that fee-setting mechanisms are without loss of generality.
That is, an allocation rule can be implemented through an incentive compatible and
interim individually rational Bayesian mechanism if and only if it can be implemented
via a fee-setting mechanism with an appropriately chosen fee.
Fee-setting mechanisms are conceptually simple. However, the optimal fee may be a
complicated, non-linear function of the transaction price in general. The fee functions
that are used in practice are often linear. To address the question under what conditions
linear fees are good approximations to optimal fees, we analyze a setup in which only
the buyers with the highest valuations and only the sellers with the lowest costs enter.
Such a setup can arise, for example, if high transaction costs prevent traders with low
expected gains from trade from entering. We show that in increasingly tight markets –
that is, as the threshold to enter the market increases for buyers and decreases for sellers
– the conditional distributions of entrants converge to (mirrored) Generalized Pareto
distributions, or Pareto distributions for short, and that the optimal fees converge to the
linear fees implied by Pareto distributions.
Pareto distributions allow for clear-cut results for the effects of elasticities and com-
petition. As the elasticity of supply increases, both the overall fee and the marginal
fee decrease. The overall fee also decreases as competition between private intermedi-
2See Spulber (1999) and Salanie´ (2003) for an overview of the role of private intermediaries and
governments, respectively.
3For the sake of brevity we will refer to the entity designing the mechanism as the intermediary,
which can be either a private intermediary or a government.
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aries becomes more intensive or, equivalently, as the government’s need to raise revenue
decreases. Somewhat surprisingly, the marginal fee increases as competition between
intermediaries becomes more intensive if the elasticity of demand exceeds the elasticity
of supply. Even more surprisingly, the overall fee decreases as the elasticity of demand
decreases.4 This seems to contradict the standard notion that inelastically demanded
goods are taxed more heavily. Roughly, the intuition is that both the seller and the
intermediary want to have higher prices when the elasticity of demand decreases; but
absent a reduced fee the seller wants to increase the price by more than the intermediary
wishes him to, which makes the intermediary lower his fees. These comparative statics
generalize beyond the class of Pareto distributions, at times with the qualification that
they hold for the convex lower and the concave upper bound of the fee function (which
coincide with the fee for Pareto distribution).
The results summarized so far also generalize naturally to a multilateral trade problem
with multiple buyers and one seller: the seller sets a reserve price rather than a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to buyers, and buyers participate in a second-price auction. Moreover,
auction results can be embedded in a random matching model, in which a seller is
matched with a random number of buyers and the bargaining process is modeled as an
auction.
Our results on fees and taxes for bilateral and multilateral trade shed light on empir-
ical observations in a variety of industries, such as on commissions of auction houses and
websites, bargaining over slotting allowances, markups of retailers, and posted prices of
currency exchange offices and used car dealers. Even real estate brokerage fees, which
are often considered a prime example of a solution of a principal-agent problem, can be
explained naturally as solutions to an optimal pricing setup. Indeed, many of the styl-
ized facts in real estate brokerage that appear puzzling, if viewed from a principal-agent
perspective, are predictions of our optimal pricing problem.5,6
4This result holds for arbitrarily small positive weights on social welfare. For a zero weight on social
welfare and Pareto distributions, the fee does not depend on the elasticity of demand.
5Though our analysis is confined to the question of optimal pricing, it is worth noting that fee-setting
mechanisms will provide some incentives for the broker to exert effort if effort increases the probability
of a sale because the fee is paid if and only if a transaction occurs.
6These stylized facts include brokers’ use of fee-setting mechanisms, the linearity of these fees, their
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Moreover, assuming intermediaries employ constrained efficient mechanisms, our
analysis suggests a method for the empirical assessment of how competitive the fee
structure in a given industry is, provided one has estimates of the elasticities of demand
and supply for that industry. This question is relevant for anti-trust cases such as the
case against Sotheby’s and Christie’s, and for the recent investigation of the real estate
brokerage industry (see Department of Justice, 2007).
The present paper relates to the literature on Bayesian mechanism design with two-
sided private information, which was pioneered by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
and Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989). Our analysis considers the whole frontier that
characterizes the efficient tradeoffs between revenue and welfare, whereas previous work
has focused on certain points along that frontier, such as on the welfare-maximizing (or
ex post efficient) point, the revenue-maximizing point or the point that maximizes wel-
fare subject to budget balance.7 Moreover, fee-setting mechanisms provide an empirical
counterpart to the dominant strategy implementation, which is much more prevalent
in theory than in practice. The facts that equilibrium under a fee-setting mechanism
is essentially unique, and that fee-setting mechanisms can be used to implement any
incentive compatible allocation rule contrast with properties of the double-auction of
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).8 Further, fee-setting mechanisms are ex post individ-
ually rational, which generalizes a result obtained by Gresik (1991).
Jullien and Mariotti (2006) studied fee setting by intermediaries in a common value
setup, while Shy and Wang (2011) compared the performance of percentage fees charged
by credit-card companies to fixed fees as a function of the vertical market structure.
Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2008) also addressed fee setting by intermediaries in their
study of an intermediary that sets a constant fee in an auction with the sequential
arrival of an infinite number of buyers. In contrast to these papers, our paper analyzes
invariance to large variations in real estate prices, and the observation that direct sellers on for-sale-by-
owner platforms achieve the same price as the gross price achieved by owners selling through a broker.
See Hsieh and Moretti (2003) and Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magne´ (2009).
7See, for example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), Makowski
and Mezzetti (1993), or Baliga and Vohra (2003).
8As noted by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), for uniform distributions the double-auction has a
linear equilibrium that implements the surplus maximizing allocation rule subject to budget balance.
However, there are many other equilibria (see, for example, Leininger, Linhart, and Radner (1989)).
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thin markets with a small number of traders, two-sided private information, and different
levels of competitiveness. This difference in assumptions drives our main findings, such
as the shape (and, under some conditions, the linearity) of the optimal fee function, and
the effects of the elasticities and of competitiveness.
In public finance, the optimal structure of indirect taxes has received little attention
compared to the optimal structure of possibly non-linear income taxes.9 To the extent
that imperfect competition has been accounted for, this strand of literature has typically
stayed within a setup with complete information; see, for example, Anderson, De Palma,
and Kreider (2001a,b). We analyze the optimal structure of indirect taxes when both
sides of the market are thin and have private information, which is a plausible set of as-
sumptions whenever matching frictions are substantive. We also derive conditions under
which, respectively, a specific tax and an ad valorem tax are optimal. This contrasts
with models of complete information, where ad valorem taxes are typically found to be
welfare superior (Anderson, De Palma, and Kreider, 2001b).
Lastly, the efficacy of simple mechanisms relative to elaborate optimal mechanism has
recently been investigated under a variety of setups; see, for example, McAfee (2002),
Rogerson (2003), Chu and Sappington (2007), Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011), and
Loertscher and Niedermayer (2012a). The present paper contributes to this strand of
literature by providing conditions under which simple (that is, linear) fee-setting mech-
anisms are optimal, or converge to optimality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 derives the constrained efficient, or optimal, allocation rules. Sections 4 and 5
analyze, respectively, the case with bilateral and multilateral trade. Section 6 concludes.
All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
We study different forms of the following trading problem with agents who are privately
informed about their types. There are B buyers indexed by b ∈ B whose valuations vb for
9See, for example, Salanie´ (2003, Chapter 3).
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one unit of a homogeneous good are independently and identically distributed according
to the twice continuously differentiable distribution function F with support [v, v] and
density f(vb) > 0 for all vb ∈ (v, v). Similarly, there are S sellers indexed by s ∈ S whose
costs cs for producing one unit of a homogeneous good are independently and identically
distributed according to the twice continuously differentiable distribution function G
with support [c, c] and density g(cs) > 0 for all cs ∈ (c, c).
10 Each buyer demands and
each seller supplies at most one unit. All agents are risk-neutral and have quasilinear
preferences, so that the expected payoff of a buyer b with valuation vb who receives a
unit of the good with probability q and pays a transfer payment t is vbq− t. Analogously,
the expected payoff to a seller s with cost cs who receives a transfer t and produces the
good with probability q is t− csq. We assume that the value of the outside option of not
participating in the mechanism is 0 for all agents. For expositional simplicity, in most of
the paper we will assume v = c and v = c. In the appendix, we deal with the case when
this does not hold.
There is also a mechanism designer in this model, which is either a government or a
private intermediary, and which we simply refer to as the intermediary. We assume that
buyers and sellers can only trade via the intermediary. This intermediary maximizes the
weighted average of expected revenue and expected welfare as described in detail below.
The model can be summarized as 〈B, S〉. Within the independent private values
environment, this model is fairly general. It subsumes, for example, the model analyzed
by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), which focuses on the bilateral trade case 〈1, 1〉
without assuming v = c and v = c and the 〈B, S〉-model of Gresik and Satterthwaite
(1989), which assumes v = c and v = c.
Define the virtual valuation function Φ and the virtual cost function Γ, which are
well known in mechanism design, as
Φ(v) = v −
1− F (v)
f(v)
and Γ(c) = c +
G(c)
g(c)
.
10These assumptions are slightly weaker than the usually made assumptions f(vb) > 0 for vb ∈ [v, v]
and g(cs) > 0 for cs ∈ [c, c]. For some of our asymptotic results, more insights can be gained by using
our weaker assumption.
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Further, define the weighted virtual valuation and weighted virtual cost functions as
Φα(v) = (1− α)v + αΦ(v) and Γα(c) = (1− α)c+ αΓ(c),
that is, as the weighted average of valuation and virtual valuation and the weighted
average of cost and virtual cost. In the main text, we focus our attention on the regular
case by assuming that Φ(v) and Γ(c) are strictly increasing functions (that is, that My-
erson’s regularity condition holds), and we deal with the irregular case in the appendix.
Observe that strict monotonicity of Φ(v) and Γ(c) implies that Φα(v) and Γα(c) are
strictly monotone for any α ∈ [0, 1].11 We further assume that Φ and Γ are continuously
differentiable.
As observed by Bulow and Roberts (1989), Φ(v) can be interpreted as the interme-
diary’s marginal revenue and Γ(c) as the marginal cost when increasing the buyer’s and
seller’s probability of trade.12 v and c are the marginal utilities of the buyer and the
seller when the probability of trade increases marginally. Consequently, Φα(v) can be
seen as the weighted average of marginal revenue and marginal utility and Γα(c) as the
weighted average of marginal cost and marginal utility.
Denoting by Ex the expectation taken with respect to the distribution of the random
variable x, we observe that for any p
Ec[Γ(c)|c ≤ p] =
∫ p
c
Γ(c)g(c)dc
G(p)
= p and Ev[Φ(v)|v ≥ p] =
∫ v
p
Φ(v)f(v)dv
1− F (p)
= p. (1)
This can be established, for example, using integration by parts.
3 Optimal Allocation Rules
We first consider the problem of the intermediary as a general mechanism design problem.
When deriving the optimal fee-setting mechanism, we then only need to ensure that it
11Note that for α > 1, monotone virtual valuations and virtual costs are not sufficient to guarantee
monotonicity of Φα and Γα. A sufficient condition for this is that the hazard rate f(v)/(1 − F (v)) is
increasing and that the reverse hazard rate g(c)/G(c) is decreasing.
12That is, interpret the probability that v ≥ p and c ≤ p as quantity demanded and supplied q at
price p, that is, q := 1 − F (p) and q := G(p). Thus, the inverse demand and supply functions are
pd(q) := F−1(1− q) and ps(q) := G−1(q), yielding R(q) := qF−1(1− q) and C(q) := qG−1(q) as revenue
and cost functions, respectively. Taking derivative w.r.t. q and substituting back in yields R′(q) = Φ(p)
and C′(q) = Γ(c).
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implements the allocation rule that is the solution to the general mechanism design
problem.
Direct Mechanisms A direct mechanism asks all buyers and sellers to report their
types vb ∈ [v, v] and cs ∈ [c, c]. It consists of an allocation ruleQ(v, c) and a payment (or
transfer) rule T (v, c), where v = (v1, .., vB) and c = (c1, .., cS). Qmaps into [0, 1]
B+S and
T maps into RB+S. The elements of the vector Q(v, c) represent the probabilities that
individual agents will trade, that is Qb(v, c) for b ∈ B represents buyer b’s probability of
buying and Qs(v, c) for s ∈ S represents seller s’s probability of selling if agents report
(v, c). Similarly, T (v, c) is the vector of transfers, that is Tb(v, c) is buyer b’s payment
to the intermediary and Ts(v, c) is the payment seller s receives from the intermediary.
A direct mechanism is feasible if
∑
b∈BQb(v, c) ≤
∑
s∈SQs(v, c) for all (v, c) ∈
[v, v]B× [c, c]S, and in what follows we implicitly restrict our attention to feasible mecha-
nisms. Denote by v−b the vector v without vb, that is v−b := (v1, v2, ..., vb−1, vb+1, ..., vB).
The interim probabilities of trade for buyer b of type vb and seller s of type cs are, respec-
tively, qb(vb) := Ev−b,c[Qb(v, c)] and qs(cs) := Ev,c−s[Qs(v, c)]. Analogously, the interim
expected transfer from buyer b and to seller s are, respectively, tb(vb) := Ev−b,c[Tb(v, c)]
and ts(cs) := Ev,c−s [Ts(v, c)].
A direct mechanism (Q,T ) is said to be incentive compatible if agents have an incen-
tive to report their types truthfully and interim individually rational if agents are willing
to participate.13,14 By the revelation principle, the focus on direct, incentive-compatible,
and individually rational mechanisms is without loss of generality. An allocation rule
Q can be implemented via an incentive-compatible direct mechanism if and only if the
13Formally, incentive compatibility means vbqb(vb)− tb(vb) ≥ vbqb(vˆb)− tb(vˆb) and ts(cs)− csqs(cs) ≥
ts(cˆs) − csqs(cˆs) for all b ∈ B, all s ∈ S, all vb, vˆb ∈ [v, v], and all cs, cˆs ∈ [c, c]. Interim individual
rationality means vbqb(vb) − tb(vb) ≥ 0 and ts(cs) − csqs(cs) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ B, all s ∈ S, and all
(v, c) ∈ [v, v]B × [c, c]S .
14Interim individual rationality constraints are very natural if the mechanism designer is a private
intermediary. In the case that government is the mechanism designer, the requirement that the mech-
anism satisfy individual rationality is less obvious as the power of coercing individuals is part of what
distinguishes the state from private agents. Nonetheless, for reasons that are admittedly outside the
model, it may still be desirable that government’s mechanisms satisfy individual rationality; see Hellwig
(2003, Section 7) for a discussion of these questions in the context of providing public goods when agents’
valuations are their private information. This is also related to the view widely held in the public finance
literature that non-distortionary lump-sum transfers are not feasible (see Salanie´ (2003)).
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allocation rule is such that, for all s and all cs, qs(cs) is weakly decreasing in cs and, for
all b and all vb, qb(vb) is weakly increasing in vb. It follows that an allocation rule can be
implemented as the outcome of a (Bayes Nash) equilibrium of any mechanism if and only
if the allocation rule can be implemented in an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.
For terminological simplicity, we say that an allocation rule is implementable if it can be
implemented through an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.
Optimal Allocation Rules The ex ante expected social surplus that is generated
under the mechanism (Q,T ) is W = Ev,c
[∑
b∈B vbQb(v, c)−
∑
s∈S csQs(v, c)
]
, which
only depends on the allocation rule because lump-sum transfers do not affect welfare.
The expected revenue of the intermediary is
R = Ev,c
[∑
b∈B
Tb(v, c)Qb(v, c)−
∑
s∈S
Ts(v, c)Qs(v, c)
]
.
The goal of the intermediary is to maximize the weighted average (1 − α)W + αR
for some α ∈ [0, 1]. The following proposition provides a uniform statement that encom-
passes as special cases various problems that have been studied in the literature and that
are discussed at the end of this section.
Proposition 1. (a) For any incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism
(1− α)W + αR = E
[∑
b∈B
Φα(vb)Qb(v, c)−
∑
s∈S
Γα(cs)Qs(v, c)
]
− α
[∑
b∈B
U b +
∑
s∈S
Us
]
,
where U b = vqb(v) − tb(v) and U s = ts(c) − cqs(c) are the utilities of the least efficient
agents.
(b) Let the α-allocation rule Qα be such that it maximizes
∑
b∈B Φα(vb)Qb(v, c) −∑
s∈S Γα(cs)Qs(v, c) for every realization of (v, c). A mechanism maximizes (1−α)W +
αR if and only if it gives zero utility to the least efficient agents and implements the
α-allocation rule Qα.
The following simple interpretation can be given for the α-allocation rule Qα. For
any realization of reported types (v, c) define the α-Walrasian sets of buyers and sellers
as those buyers and sellers who would trade in a Walrasian equilibrium if the true types
3 OPTIMAL ALLOCATION RULES 11
were Φα(vb) and Γα(cs) for all b ∈ B and for all s ∈ S. Then set Q
α
b (v, c) = Q
α
s (v, c) = 1
for all buyers and sellers who belong to the α-Walrasian sets and Qαb (v, c) = Q
α
s (v, c) = 0
for all others. Note that for α = 0 the α-allocation rule coincides with the Walrasian
equilibrium because at α = 0 the objective function is (1 − α)W + αR = W and the
α-allocation rule induces the Walrasian sets of agents, defined with respect to their true
types vb and cs, to trade. For α = 1, the objective function is (1 − α)W + αR = R.
Therefore, the α-allocation rule with α = 1 maximizes revenue and induces trade by the
Walrasian sets defined with respect to Φ(vb) and Γ(cs).
An alternative interpretation of α is as a measure of competition in a standard
oligopoly model. As an analogy, consider, for example, a Cournot model with N sym-
metric firms who sell homogenous goods to consumers with demand 1 − F (p) and let
R measure total profits. Using arguments analogous to those in footnote 12, one can
show that the symmetric equilibrium of this model predicts the same prices, welfare, and
revenues as the solution of maximizing (1 − α)W + αR with α = 1/N . Further, α = 1
corresponds to monopoly and α = 0 represents perfect competition. It is also worth
noting that the interpretation of α is the same across different oligopoly models.15
The set of all feasible mechanisms can be represented in revenue-welfare-space, as for
the example in Figure 1 (shaded area). Let Rα and Wα denote, respectively, expected
revenue and welfare under an α-allocation rule. The set of points (Rα,Wα) for α ≥ 0
can be viewed as the maximum revenue frontier, since it represents all mechanisms
that maximize revenue subject to achieving a certain welfare level (dashed and solid
lines in Figure 1). The subset of points (Rα,Wα) for α ∈ [0, 1] can be viewed as the
efficient frontier in analogy to the term in finance, since it represents all mechanisms
that maximize welfare subject to a revenue constraint (solid line in Figure 1).16 It is not
hard to show that the slope and continuity properties of these frontiers are as depicted
15For example, if competition is Bertrand rather than Cournot, α = 1 still represents monopoly and
α = 0 perfect competition, but the latter occurs already for N = 2 because under Bertrand competition
two is enough for perfect competition.
16In finance, the set of all points that minimize variance for a given expected return is the minimum
variance frontier. The subset of this frontier that puts positive weight on expected return is the efficient
frontier.
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Figure 1: The efficient frontier (solid) and the maximum revenue frontier (solid and
dashed) for the bilateral trade problem with uniform distributions F and G on sup-
port [0, 1]. Social welfare and revenues are normalized by the first-best social welfare
W0 = 1/6. The highest achievable revenue is R1 = 1/24. The maximum social welfare
achievable under a balanced budget is Wα(0) = 9/64 with α(0) = 1/3.
in the figure in general.17
Of course, one could also consider the problem of maximizing W subject to R ≥ R
instead of maximizing (1 − α)W + αR. Let λ∗ be the optimal value of the Lagrange-
multiplier for the constraint R ≥ R; that is, the maximizer of the LagrangianW +λ(R−
R). The solution to this constrained optimization problem is the same as the solution
to the problem of maximizing (1 − α)W + αR with α = λ∗/(1 + λ∗),18 where α has
the interpretation of the Ramsey number widely used in public finance and the theory
of regulation and nonlinear pricing.19 Notice that λ∗ will depend on R, in which case
we write α(R) = λ∗(R)/(1 + λ∗(R)). However, if one is maximizing welfare in multiple
markets and the market under consideration is small relative to the whole economy, one
can also treat λ∗ as an approximately exogenous parameter that measures the social
17That the revenue R0 is negative for the first best allocation α = 0 holds for the bilateral trade
problem and for any 〈B,S〉 if v = c and v = c holds. It may be positive for B > 1 = S and v > c.
See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), and Makowski and Mezzetti
(1993), respectively.
18For the case of bilateral trade, Bulow and Roberts (1989, p.1084) observed the equivalence of
maximizing (1−α)W +αR and the problem of maximizingW subject to R ≥ R, which can be seen as a
Ramsey pricing problem. For analogous reasoning in the context of public goods provision, see Hellwig
(2003).
19See, for example, Wilson (Chapter 5 1993).
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opportunity costs of public funds, which determines α. Empirical studies assess the
social cost of tax revenue raised to be in the range between $0.2 and $0.6 per dollar
raised.20 This corresponds to an α between 0.17 and 0.38.
Three important special cases have been studied in the literature: α = α(0), which
maximizes social surplus subject to budget balance; α = 1, which maximizes the revenue
of the intermediary; and α = 0, which is ex post efficient trade.21 Moreover, for B = S =
1 Gresik (1991) has constructed a mechanism that implements the α(0)-allocation rule
and respects individual rationality ex post, that is, where agents are willing to participate
after the realization of the types of other agents is revealed to them.22
4 Bilateral Trade
4.1 General Implementation Result
In this section, we study the bilateral trade problem 〈1, 1〉. We begin with the definition
of a fee-setting mechanism.
Definition 1. In a fee-setting mechanism for bilateral trade, the intermediary first an-
nounces a fee function ω(·) and the seller sets a price p. If the buyer is willing to trade,
he pays the price p, the intermediary receives the fee ω(p), and the seller receives the net
price p− ω(p). If the buyer is not willing to trade, there are no payments.
Now consider an intermediary that wants to ensure that trade occurs if and only if
v ≥ P (c) with a fee-setting mechanism, where P is some arbitrary increasing function
mapping from [c, c] to [v, v]. The easiest way to derive the optimal fee-setting mechanism
is to first derive the dominant strategy implementation: The buyer pays the highest
20See, for example, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) for an estimate of the social cost of taxation
in the U.S. See also Perrigne and Vuong (2011) for a recent econometric application of this idea and a
discussion of the literature.
21Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) derive results for B = S = 1 and α ∈ {0, α(0), 1}. See Gresik
and Satterthwaite (1989) for arbitrary 〈B,S〉, c = v, c = v, and α = 0; Baliga and Vohra (2003) for
arbitrary 〈B,S〉 and α = 1; and Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) for B > 1 = S, v > c, and α = α(0).
22Formally, a direct mechanism is said to satisfy ex post individual rationality if, for all b ∈ B, all
s ∈ S, and all (v, c) ∈ [v, v]B × [c, c]S , vb − Tb(v, c) ≥ 0 for all buyers b who receive a unit (and
Tb(v, c) ≤ 0 for all buyer who do not) and Ts(v, c) − cs ≥ 0 for all sellers s who produce a unit (and
Ts(v, c) ≥ 0 for all sellers who do not).
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valuation that he could have reported and still obtained the good, P (c), in case of trade.
The seller receives the highest cost he could have reported and still sold the good, P−1(v).
If there is no trade, there are no transfers. That reporting one’s true type is a dominant
strategy for both buyer and seller is easy to verify.
Now we can transform the dominant strategy implementation into a fee-setting mech-
anism, in which the buyer pays the gross price P (c) and the seller receives the net price
P (c)−ω(P (c)). It is easy to check that the buyer will accept if and only if v ≥ P (c) and
receives the same payoff as with the dominant strategy implementation. Therefore, it is
only left to confirm that the seller receives the same expected payoff as in the dominant
strategy mechanism, P−1(v). Note that in the dominant strategy implementation, the
seller receives Ev[P
−1(v)|v ≥ P (c)] in expectations over v conditional on trade occurring.
Since the seller is risk neutral, the intermediary could alternatively pay the seller the ex-
pected value as the net price P (c) − ω(P (c)). Equating the net price with the seller’s
expected payoff and replacing P (c) with p gives the optimal fee stated in Proposition 2
(b). Part (a) of the proposition is proved in Appendix C.23
Proposition 2. (a) The focus on fee-setting mechanisms is without loss of generality.
That is, a deterministic allocation rule Q is incentive-compatible if and only if there
exists a fee-setting mechanism that implements it.
(b) Let P (c) be an increasing function. An allocation rule in which trade occurs if
and only if v ≥ P (c) can be implemented by the following fee-setting mechanism. The
intermediary charges the fee function
ω(p) = p− Ev[P
−1(v)|v ≥ p]
for p ≤ v and an arbitrary ω(p) > v − p for p > v. A seller with cost c ≤ P−1(v) sets
the price P (c) and a buyer with valuation v accepts if and only if p ≤ v. Moreover, the
equilibrium is essentially unique in the sense that equilibria only differ with respect to
actions of types that never trade in any equilibrium.
23Given the fee in Proposition 2, it is easy to verify that the seller’s payoff is maximized at p = P (c)
because his expected payoff is (Ev[P
−1(v)|v ≥ p] − c)(1 − F (p)) =
∫ v
p
(P−1(v) − c)dF (v), so that the
first-order condition with respect to p is satisfied at P−1(p) = c.
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Proposition 1 implies that for a given α the optimal allocation rule is to allow trade
if and only if Φα(v) ≥ Γα(c), or equivalently, v ≥ Φ
−1
α (Γα(c)). Hence, setting P (c) =
Φ−1α (Γα(c)), Proposition 2 gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1. An optimal allocation rule can be implemented with the following fee setting
mechanism. The intermediary sets the fee function
ωα(p) = p− Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p] (2)
for p ≤ v and an arbitrary ωα(p) > v − p for p > v. A seller with cost c ≤ P
−1
α (v) sets
the price Pα(c) := Φ
−1
α (Γα(c)) and a buyer with valuation v accepts if and only if p ≤ v.
As an illustration, consider the example underlying Figure 1 for which F and G are
uniform on [0, 1]. In this example, which is also used in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
and Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), a profit-maximizing intermediary will set the fee
ω1(p) = p/2, a welfare-maximizing intermediary will set the fee ω0(p) = p/2 − 1/2, and
an intermediary maximizing welfare subject to budget balance will set the fee ωα(0) =
p/2− 1/4, where α(0) = 1/3. Implied social welfare and revenues are of course the same
as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and, for α(0), the same as in Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983).
4.2 Participation by the Most Motivated
We now consider markets in which only the most motivated traders participate, that
is, the lowest cost sellers and the highest valuation buyers. We will assume that the
fraction participating is very small. The first reason that such an analysis is of interest
is that, for many markets, this is a good approximation. For example, in real estate
markets typically less than 5 percent of homeowners offer their property for sale at any
given time. The second reason is that this analysis provides insights that are valid even
if the above assumption is not met. In particular, it allows us to describe fee structures
in terms of the fundamental economic concepts of the elasticities of demand and supply
and the degree of competitiveness. It also allows for a comparison of optimal fee setting
and taxation and optimal one-sided pricing.
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Assume now that the reason that only a small fraction of agents – those who are most
efficient or most motivated – enters the market is that there are additional opportunity
costs of trading for buyers and sellers. It is simplest to think of these opportunity costs
as transaction costs. As an example, if a potential buyer’s valuation for a house is only
slightly higher than the current owner’s when ignoring transaction costs, they may be
unwilling to trade if costs of moving are taken into account. Opportunity costs may
also arise for other reasons, such as the option value of future trade.24 Below are two
examples of what these opportunity costs may look like.
Example 1 Consider a buyer and a seller whose net valuation v and net cost c have
the distributions F and G with supports [0, 1]. Assume that the seller’s gross cost is
cˆ = c+ρ and the buyer’s gross valuation is vˆ = v−ρ, with the additive opportunity cost
ρ ≥ 0. The support of the seller’s gross cost distribution is [ρ, 1 + ρ]. For the buyer, the
support is [−ρ, 1−ρ]. Buyers and sellers with valuation vˆ and cost cˆ outside the relevant
range [ρ, 1− ρ] trade with probability zero. As ρ goes to 1/2, the length of the relevant
range goes to zero, and so do the masses of buyers 1 − F (2ρ) and sellers G(1 − 2ρ) in
the relevant range.
Example 2 Consider transaction costs that stretch rather than shift valuations and
costs. Take again F and G with supports [0, 1]. Assume the seller’s gross cost is cˆ = ρc
with ρ ≥ 1. This stretches the seller’s support by a factor ρ to [0, ρ]. Similarly, let
vˆ = 1 − ρ(1 − v), which stretches the buyer’s support by a factor ρ to [−(ρ − 1), 1].
Traders outside the relevant range [0, 1] trade with probability zero. The masses of
sellers G(1/ρ) and buyers 1 − F (1 − 1/ρ) in the relevant range go to zero as ρ goes to
infinity.
The commonality between the two examples is that only the most motivated buyers
and sellers enter, and the mass of buyers and sellers in the relevant range goes to zero.
Such transformations of distributions are dealt with in extreme value theory in statistics.
24It may be worthwhile to delay trade and search for a more efficient trading partner. For this
interpretation of opportunity costs, one would need to model the option value of future trade in a search
market, which adds a further level of complexity.
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Figure 2: Density of truncated, rescaled distribution Fu(v) = 1−[1−F (v−u(v−v))]/[1−
F (v−u(v−v))], for u ∈ {1, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, 0.2} for a Beta distribution with support [0, 1] and
density f(v) ∝ v3(1− v)3 (solid line) compared to an approximating Generalized Pareto
density with support [0, 1] (dashed). Masses in the relevant range are (a) 1−F (1− 1) =
1, (b) 1 − F (1 − 0.7) = 0.87, (c) 1 − F (1 − 0.5) = 0.5, (d) 1 − F (1 − 0.3) = 0.13,
(e) 1 − F (1 − 0.2) = 0.033. As the mass decreases, the distribution converges to the
approximating Pareto distribution and the approximating Pareto distribution converges
to the limiting Pareto distribution.
Appendix B contains a brief summary of this theory.
Extreme Value Theory For our purposes, the main result of the theory of excee-
dences in extreme value theory is summarized in Theorem 1 in Appendix B. The theorem
says that for any F that satisfies some weak regularity condition,
lim
u→0
1−
1− F (v − u(v − v))
1− F (v − u(v − v))
= 1−
(
v − v
v − v
)β
=: F ∗(v), (3)
where convergence is uniform and β is some constant. The left-hand side of (3) is the
rescaled distribution conditional on being above the threshold v−u(v−v). According to
Theorem 1, this truncated and rescaled distribution converges to a Generalized Pareto
distribution F ∗ as the threshold v − u(v − v) goes to the finite upper bound v. See
Appendix B for a discussion of the regularity condition (which we show to be satisfied
in our setup) and the infinite upper bound version of the theorem.
The motivation for this theory was an empirical regularity found in many situations:
that the upper tail of a distribution is well approximated by a (Generalized) Pareto
distribution. A prominent example is the distribution of the highest 20 percent of income
and wealth in many countries, which was first observed by Vilfredo Pareto.25
25Other examples include the distribution of the strength of earthquakes in historical data (which tend
to contain only the most severe earthquakes); and for the discrete type variant of the Pareto distribution
– Zipf’s law – the distribution of the frequency of the most common words in a larger text and the sizes
of the largest cities in most countries.
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Figure 2 shows the density of a distribution of which only the upper tail is taken. In
particular, it shows only the distribution conditional on being on [1−u, 1] rather than the
full support [0, 1]. As depicted in the figure, moving the truncation point 1− u upwards
brings the density of the conditional distribution closer to the density of a Generalized
Pareto distribution.
We note that symmetric results to Theorem 1 hold for distributions that are truncated
from above. In particular, for a distribution G satisfying a weak regularity condition
with a finite lower bound c, truncation from above leads asymptotically to a mirrored
Generalized Pareto distribution, limu→0G(c + u(c− c))/G(c+ u(c− c)) = [(c− c)/(c−
c)]σ =: G∗(c).
In applied statistics the asymptotic results of extreme value theory are seen as ap-
proximations when “close enough” to the limit. In particular, Theorem 1 is understood
to mean that for u “close to 0”, a Generalized Pareto distribution is a “good approxi-
mation” of the truncated distribution above the threshold v − u(v − v). This resembles
the application of other asymptotic results, such as the central limit theorem.26 Here, as
there, it is then an empirical question of what “close to 0” means. For the distribution
of income and wealth the upper 20 percent of the distribution is sufficiently close to 0
to allow for a good approximation by a Pareto distribution. For the numerical example
considered in Figure 2, upper tails consisting of the highest 13 percent (Figure 2 (d))
and the higest 3.3 percent (Figure 2 (e)) of the distributions are already very close to a
Pareto distribution.
Convergence to Linear Fees We now show how adding opportunity costs to the
buyer’s and seller’s initial valuation and cost affects the fee structure. Assume the initial
distributions F and G have support [0, 1]. This assumption is without loss of generality,
as will become evident shortly. We consider a sequence of linear transformations of c
and v, indexed by k. Let the seller’s gross cost ck and the buyer’s gross valuation vk be
ck =
vk − ck
uSk
c+ ck and vk = vk − (1− v)
vk − ck
uBk
,
26Rather than having an infinite n, a large finite n is seen as a justification for assuming that the
distribution of the average of n random draws is approximately normal.
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with respective supports [ck, ck+(vk−ck)/u
S
k ] and [vk−(vk−ck)/u
B
k , vk]. The parameters
ck and vk shift the supports. u
S
k can be interpreted as follows. Sellers with costs outside
the relevant range [ck, vk] trade with probability zero. The ratio of the length of the
relevant range vk−ck to the length of ck’s support [(vk−ck)/u
S
k+ck]−ck is u
S
k . Therefore,
the mass of sellers in the relevant range is G(uSk ). Similarly, for buyers, the ratio of the
relevant range is uBk and the mass of buyers in the relevant range is 1− F (1− u
B
k ).
Define the normalized (gross) cost c˜ = (c − ck)/(vk − ck), the normalized (gross)
valuation v˜ = (c − ck)/(vk − ck), and the normalized price p˜ = (p − ck)/(vk − ck).
The distributions of the normalized gross cost c˜ and the normalized gross valuation v˜,
truncated to [ck, vk] and denoted, respectively, G˜k and F˜k, are then given as
G˜k(c˜) =
G(uSk c˜)
G(uSk )
and F˜k(v˜) = 1−
1− F (1− uBk (1− v˜))
1− F (1− uBk )
. (4)
The normalized fee is defined as ω˜(p˜) = ω(p)/(vk − ck). Now we can return to the
examples provided before.
Example 1 revisited Let ck = 1/2− 1/(2k), vk = 1/2 + 1/(2k), and u
S
k = u
B
k = 1/k.
For k = 1 the supports of c and v are [0, 1]. As k goes to infinity, the supports converge
to [1/2, 3/2] and [−1/2, 1/2], respectively. For example, let α = 1 and F and G be
uniform. Plugging this into (2) gives a fee ω(p) = (p − ck)/2 = (p − 1/2 − 1/(2k))/2,
which converges to (p − 1/2)/2 as k goes to infinity. The normalized fee ω˜(p˜) = p˜/2 is
invariant to changes in k.
Example 2 revisited Let ck = 0, vk = 1, and u
S
k = u
B
k = 1/k. For k = 1, the
supports of c and v are [0, 1]. As k goes to infinity, the supports of c and v go to [0,∞)
and (−∞, 0], respectively. The relevant range remains [0, 1] for all k. For the example of
α = 1 and F and G uniform, the optimal fee is ω(p) = p/2, and the optimal normalized
fee ω˜(p˜) = p˜/2, which is also invariant to changes in k.
As illustrated by the examples, ck and vk are secondary to the analysis. The driving
force is that uSk and u
B
k go to zero as k goes to infinity. Thus the mass of entering traders
vanishes. The general principle behind the convergence of the normalized fee to a linear
function observed in the two examples above is as follows.
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Figure 3: Optimal fee ωα(·) for α = 1 and truncated, rescaled distributions Fu(v) =
1−[1−F (v−u(v−v))]/[1−F (v−u(v−v))], and Gu(c) = G(c+u(c−c))/G(c+u(c−c)) for
the same setup as in Figure 2; that is, for u ∈ {1, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, 0.2} for Beta distributions
with support [0, 1] and density f(x) = g(x) ∝ x3(1 − x)3 (solid line) compared to an
approximating linear fee (dashed).
Proposition 3. Assume F and G have bounded support and Φ and Γ are continuously
differentiable. Let the shifting constants ck, vk be arbitrary sequences satisfying ck < vk
for all k. Let the ratios of the relevant ranges uSk and u
B
k be sequences that go to 0 as k
goes to infinity. Then, as k →∞,
(i) the buyer’s and the seller’s normalized distributions converge to Generalized Pareto
and mirrored Generalized Pareto distributions, respectively: limk→∞ F˜k(v˜) = F˜
∗(v˜) :=
1− (1− v˜)β and limk→∞ G˜k(c˜) = G˜
∗(c˜) := c˜σ.
(ii) the normalized fee converges to a linear fee:
ω˜α(p˜) = αp˜
[
1
α + σ
]
− (1− α)(1− p˜)
[
σ
(α+ σ)(β + 1)
]
(5)
While the proof of convergence of arbitrary distributions with bounded support and
continuously differentiable virtual valuation functions relies on results from extreme value
theory, it is relatively easy to check that convergence is immediate if one begins with
(mirrored) Generalized Pareto distributions G∗(c) = cσ and F ∗(v) = 1 − (1 − v)β: one
only to verify that G∗ and F ∗ are invariant to truncation and rescaling as defined in
(4). Further, plugging G∗ and F ∗ into (2) yields a linear fee. Convergence of the fee
to linearity is illustrated in Figure 3, which is based on the numerical example from
Figure 2.
Equation (5) lends itself well to an economic interpretation and comparative stat-
ics. It is useful to introduce the concept of shifted elasticities of supply ηs(c) = (c −
c)g(c)/G(c) = σ and demand ηd(v) = (v − v)f(v)/(1 − F (v)) = β, which deals with
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percentage changes of c − c rather than c and percentage changes of v − v rather than
v. Observe that the elasticities of supply ηs(c) = cg(c)/G(c) = σc/(c − c) and demand
ηd(v) = | − vf(v)/(1− F (v))| = βv/(v − v) are proportional to the shifted elasticities σ
and β, respectively.27 For the sake of brevity, we will do comparative statics with respect
to changes of shifted elasticities, which corresponds to overall changes of the standard
elasticities. For α = 1, the second term in brackets disappears and the first term in
brackets represents the fee charged by a profit-maximizing intermediary. The fee is inde-
pendent of the shifted elasticity of demand β. For α = 0, the first term disappears and
the second term represents the subsidy paid by a welfare-maximizing intermediary. For
α = 0, this term is independent of the shifted elasticity of supply σ. Note that for the
highest price p˜ = 1, the second term (subsidy) vanishes, whereas for the (hypothetical)
lowest price p˜ = 0, the first term (profit-maximizing fee) vanishes.
The overall fee ω˜ and the slope of the fee ω˜′ both decrease as the shifted elasticity
of supply σ increases. This corresponds to the intuition that a higher elasticity leads
to a lower markup for a standard monopolist. Further, the overall fee decreases as
competition increases; that is, as α decreases. Interestingly, the slope ω˜′ increases as α
decreases if and only if β > σ. Thus, putting more weight on social welfare (or increasing
competition) will increase the marginal fee ω˜′ (and also lower the fixed component of the
fee ω˜(0)), provided demand is more elastic than supply.
An even more surprising result is that the overall fee increases as the shifted elasticity
of demand β increases. This seems to contradict the standard notion that more rent will
be extracted for less elastically demanded goods. The intuition is that marginal revenue,
which is what the seller cares about, is more responsive to a change in the elasticity of
demand than is a weighted average of marginal revenue and marginal social welfare, which
is what the intermediary cares about. The intermediary lowers the fee to counteract the
27The interpretation of elasticities follows the same logic as in footnote 12: probabilities have to be
interpreted as expected quantities. The expected quantity demanded is 1 − F (p), which implies the
elasticity of demand
ηd(p) =
∣∣∣∣d(1− F (p))/(1 − F (p))dp/p
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣− pf(p)1− F (p)
∣∣∣∣
and similarly for supply. For the shifted elasticities, replace dp/p by d(v−p)/(v−p) and d(p−c)/(p−c),
respectively.
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seller’s otherwise excessive price increase if the elasticity of demand decreases.28
We now consider the fee ω that is not normalized, denoting the limits of the bound-
aries as c := limk→∞ ck and v := limk→∞ vk. When doing so, one has to distinguish
between the case (i) c = v, for which the length of the relevant range goes to zero as in
example 1, and the case (ii) c < v, for which the length does not go to zero as in example
2.
We begin with case (ii), c < v. It is convenient to define an upper bound of the
seller’s support c and a lower bound of the buyer’s support v, satisfying c ≥ v and
v ≤ c. The non-normalized truncated distributions are G∗(cˆ) = [(cˆ − c)/(c − c)]σ and
F ∗(vˆ) = 1 − [(v − vˆ)/(v − v)]β in the limit. The corresponding weighted virtual type
functions are Γ∗α(cˆ) = cˆ+ (cˆ− c)α/σ and Φ
∗
α(vˆ) = vˆ − (v − vˆ)α/β. The non-normalized
fee can be written as
ωα(p) =
[
α(p− c)− (1− α)σ
(v − p)
β + 1
]
1
α + σ
= p− Γ∗−1α (αp+ (1− α)Φ
∗−1(p)), (6)
where the first equality stems from (5) and the definitions of the normalized variables
and the second equality can be verified by plugging in the functional forms for Γ∗α and
Φ∗α.
There is an intuitive interpretation of the right-hand side of (6) for α = 1 and α = 0.
For a purely revenue maximizing intermediary, the fee becomes ω1(p) = p−Γ
∗−1(p). Note
that Γ∗−1(x) is the price that would be set by a monopsonist with valuation x (which
equals the reserve price in a procurement auction). That is, the intermediary acts as if
he ignored that the fee would affect the seller’s price setting behavior: if the gross price
p charged to the buyer were exogenously given, a profit maximizing intermediary would
offer the net price Γ∗−1(p) to a seller whose distribution is G∗. For a purely welfare
maximizing intermediary, the fee is ω0(p) = p − Φ
∗−1(p). Observe that Φ∗−1(x) is the
price that would be set by a monopolist with cost x (which equals the reserve price in a
standard auction). This means that, in the case of a welfare-maximizing intermediary, the
28More formally, consider the second term in brackets in (5). This term represents the intermediary’s
subsidy that counteracts the seller’s markup. A higher elasticity of demand means a higher markup by
the seller which means a higher subsidy (that is, a lower fee) by the intermediary. However, the slope
ω˜′ increases with β.
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seller will set a gross price equal to his cost Φ∗−1α (Γ
∗
α(c))|α=0 = c and the intermediary will
pay the seller the markup Φ∗−1(c)− c = −ω(c) that a profit maximizing seller (without
an intermediary) would have charged as a subsidy. This sheds light on why the fee
increases with β: the intermediary compensates the seller for the markup he could earn;
this markup decreases as the elasticity of demand increases.
For case (i) (that is, c = v), there are two ways of interpreting non-normalized
values, such as p, ω(·), vk, and ck. First, in the spirit of how asymptotic results are
interpreted in applied statistics, linear fees are seen as a good (enough) approximation
of optimal fees, even outside the limit, provided that k is sufficiently large (which means
vk − ck sufficiently small). With this interpretation in mind, the same reasoning holds
as for c < v, except that c and v are replaced with ck and vk, respectively. Second, set
v = c =: p∗, so that the fee becomes
ω(p) = (p− p∗)
(
α
[
1
α + σ
]
+ (1− α)
[
σ
(α+ σ)(β + 1)
])
. (7)
The fee is zero at p = p∗ and the slope is determined by the expression after (p − p∗),
whose interpretation is similar to the one above.
It is easy to extend these results to a setup in which the seller’s opportunity cost is
due to the maximum of m price offers from outside the intermediated market, each offer
ci drawn from Gi. Similarly, the buyer’s valuation is the minimum of n price offers from
outside, each vj drawn from Fj . The seller’s cost c = max
m
i=1 ci and the buyer’s valuation
v = minnj=1 vj are then drawn approximately from the Pareto distributions G(c) = c
mσ˜
and F (v) = 1 − (1 − v)nβ˜, where σ˜ = (
∑
i σi)/m and β˜ = (
∑
j βj)/n are the average
elasticities of the Gis and Fjs.
29 Little variation of m, σ˜, n, β˜ over time would imply
little variation of the elasticities (or Pareto indices) σ = mσ˜ and β = nβ˜ and hence little
variation in the fees. Note that for a variety of topics such as income distributions and
city sizes, the empirical literature finds Pareto indices to have remarkably little variation.
To summarize, the driving force behind the fees is the level of elasticity of demand
and supply. For (mirrored) Generalized Pareto distributions G∗ and F ∗, the shifted
elasticities η
s
(c) = σ and ηd(v) = β are constant. For non-Pareto distributions, an
29c has the exact distribution G(c) =
∏
iGi(c) and v the exact distribution F (v) = 1−
∏
j(1−Fj(v)).
4 BILATERAL TRADE 24
additional effect arises because the shifted elasticities η
s
(c) and ηd(v) change with v and
c over the relevant support [ck, vk]. As u
S
k , u
B
k → 0, this additional effect vanishes and
the level of the shifted elasticities becomes the only driving force.
The above results also have an interesting implication for empirical analysis. If F and
G are approximately Pareto, then the pricing function Φ−1α (Γα(c)) will be approximately
linear, which means that the empirically observed prices p will approximately follow
a mirrored Generalized Pareto distribution Gp(p) that is a linear transformation of G:
Gp(p) = [(p−p)/(p−p)]
σ, where p and p can be computed from the pricing function. The
applied literature on extreme value theory describes several ways of estimating the shape
parameter σ of a Generalized Pareto distribution (see Coles (2001)). Given an estimate
of the shape parameter σ, one can determine the fee that a monopolist (or colluding
oligopolists) would charge, ω1(p) = (p− c)/(σ+1), which simplifies to ω1(p) = p/(σ+1)
if one assumes c = 0. Alternatively, if more data is available, c and the parameters of F
can be estimated.30 With an estimate of F , one can also compute ωα(p) for arbitrary α
and compare it with the fee observed in the data.
4.3 Results for General Distributions
We now show that, with some additional qualifications, the results for (mirrored) Gener-
alized Pareto distributions extend to distributions outside this class. We use the following
definitions to derive convex lower bounds and concave upper bounds for the optimal fee
ωα(p) for general distributions. Define the convex hull of a function h(x), denoted as
h(x), as the highest convex function that is weakly below the function h. Analogously,
define the concave hull of the function h(x), denoted as h(x), as the lowest concave func-
tion that is weakly above the function h.31 Note that Φα(v) = αΦ(v) + (1 − α)v and
Γα(c) = αΓ(c) + (1− α)c, and that this is similar for Φα and Γα(c).
30If one has data on many transactions occurring through an intermediary, the probability that the
good was sold for a certain price p identifies F (p). In our extension of this setup to an auction, which we
will discuss later, p is the reserve price set by the seller. The distribution of bids also provides information
on F . Note that in practice, the price distribution may not be exactly Pareto, for example because
quality adjusted prices are observed with noise due to imperfect measures of quality. See Loertscher
and Niedermayer (2012a) for an empirical analysis that does not assume Pareto distributions.
31See Myerson (1981) for a more detailed description of convex hulls.
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Lemma 1. ωα(p) is bounded from below and above by the following convex and concave
functions:
p− Γ−1α (αp+ (1− α)Φ
−1(p)) ≤ ωα(p) ≤ p− Γ
−1
α (αp+ (1− α)Φ
−1
(p)). (8)
Inequality (8) is the analog of (6) for Pareto distributions. The following three propo-
sitions provide extensions of the results for Pareto distributions reported in Proposition
3 to general distributions. We begin with the effect of the elasticity of supply.
Proposition 4. (i) ω0 does not depend on G (and hence on the elasticity of supply), and
ω0(p) = p− Ev[v|v ≥ p]. The fee ω0(p) has the following lower bound and upper bound:
p− Φ−1(p) ≤ ω0(p) ≤ p− Φ
−1
(p). (9)
(ii) For α > 0, ωα decreases with the elasticity of supply, formally, for two distribu-
tions Gˆ and G with ηˆs(c) > ηs(c) for all c, ωˆα(p) ≤ ωα(p) for all p, keeping F and α the
same.
We will provide an intuitive explanation for the boundaries in (9) after deriving
analogous results for the elasticity of demand.
Proposition 5. (i) For α = 1, the lower and upper bound
p− Γ−1(p) ≤ ω1(p) ≤ p− Γ
−1
(p), (10)
do not depend on F (and hence do not depend on the elasticity of demand). For G
mirrored Generalized Pareto, the bounds are tight and the fee ω1(p) = p − Γ
−1(p) is
independent of the distribution F , which is not restricted to be Pareto.
(ii) For α < 1, the lower and upper bounds
p− Γ−1α (αp+ (1− α)Ev[v|v ≥ p]) ≤ ωα(p) ≤ p− Γ
−1
α (αp+ (1− α)Ev[v|v ≥ p])
increase as the elasticity of demand increases. Formally, let vˆ ∼ Fˆ and v ∼ F with
ηˆd(p) > ηd(p) for all p,
p− Γ−1α (αp+ (1− α)Evˆ[vˆ|vˆ ≥ p]) > p− Γ
−1
α (αp+ (1− α)Ev[v|v ≥ p]),
and likewise for the upper bound, keeping G and α constant. For G mirrored Generalized
Pareto, the fee increases with the elasticity of demand. That is, ωˆα(p) > ωα(p) for all p.
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Recall that p−Φ−1(p) is the negative markup of a monopolist with cost p. Hence (9)
can be interpreted the following way. For Φ convex – which corresponds to a decreasing
monopoly pass-through rate32 – the subsidy paid by the intermediary ω0(p) is larger
than the negative markup of a monopolist p − Φ−1(p) with cost p. The opposite holds
for Φ concave. The interpretation of (10) is that for convex Γ, the fee charged by the
intermediary ω1(p) is larger than the markup of a monopsonist with valuation p.
33 The
opposite holds for Γ concave.
We next consider the effect of an increase in competitiveness (that is, a decrease of
α) on the optimal fee ωα.
Proposition 6. (i) The overall fee decreases as the market becomes more competitive.
That is, for αˆ < α, ωαˆ(p) ≤ ωα(p) for all p.
(ii) The marginal fee increases as the market becomes more competitive if the slope of
the inverse pricing function increases with competition. The marginal fee decreases with
competition if the slope decreases. The marginal fee does not change if competition does
not change the slope. Formally, for αˆ < α, ω′αˆ(p) ≥ ω
′
α(p) for all p if ∂
2P−1α (v)/∂α∂v < 0
for all v. ω′αˆ(p) ≤ ω
′
α(p) for all p if ∂
2P−1α (v)/∂α∂v > 0 and ω
′
αˆ(p) = ω
′
α(p) for all p if
∂2P−1α (v)/∂α∂v = 0.
Note that ∂2Γ−1α (Φα(v))/∂v∂α < 0 for all v iff ∂
2Φ−1α (Γα(c))/∂c∂α > 0 for all c.
∂Φ−1α (Γα(c))/∂c can be interpreted as the gross pass-through rate, that is how much the
gross price (including fees) changes as the seller’s costs increase. Hence, the statement
in the proposition can be restated as: the marginal fee increases as the market becomes
more competitive if the gross pass-through rate increases with competition. For Pareto
distributions, the condition simplifies to β > σ.
The comparative statics of the gross price Φ−1α (Γα(c)) are as follows.
Proposition 7. The gross price Φ−1α (Γα(c)) decreases (i) as demand becomes more elas-
tic, (ii) as supply become more elastic, and (iii) as the market becomes more competitive.
32Φ convex means Φ−1 = Φ−1. Therefore, the monopoly price is a concave function of costs, or
equivalently, the pass-through rate of a monopolist dΦ−1(c)/dc is decreasing in c.
33Γ convex means that the monopsony price is a concave function of valuation, or the pass-through
rate of a monopsonist is decreasing.
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4.4 Applications
Value-Added Tax Consider a seller whose costs consist of the publicly known input
price c0 and a privately observed component c1 drawn from the distribution G with
support [0, c] and a government that maximizes revenue; that is, α = 1. The total cost
c = c0 + c1 has support [c0, c0 + c]. If the distribution G can be expected to be well
approximated by a mirrored Generalized Pareto distribution, the optimal fee is close to
ω(p) = (p− c0)/(1 + σ), which corresponds to a value-added tax levied on the difference
of input and output prices p− c0.
Unit Tax We have so far only considered (mirrored) Generalized Pareto distributions
with a bounded support. However, results extend (with some modification) to the in-
finite boundary case. An infinite upper bound special case of the Generalized Pareto
distribution is the exponential distribution F (v) = 1− e−β(v−v) with support [v,∞) and
for mirrored Generalized Pareto distributions G(c) = 1−e−σ(c−c) with support (−∞, c].34
See Appendix B for more details on Generalized Pareto distributions. Plugging the cor-
responding virtual valuation and cost functions, Φα(v) = v − α/β and Γα(c) = c+ α/σ,
into (2) yields the (constant) unit tax ω(p) = α/σ − (1− α)/β.
Percentage Fees and Taxes Consider a setup in which the initial distributions of
valuations and costs have support [0,∞). If sellers below a threshold c and buyers above
a threshold v enter, the supports of G and F will be [0, c] and [v,∞), respectively.
The asymptotic Generalized Pareto distribution for the seller is then G(c) = (c/c)σ,
which implies ηs(c) = σ. For support [v,∞), the buyer’s asymptotic Generalized Pareto
distribution is either an exponential, a Type I Pareto, or a Type II Pareto distribution
(see Appendix B). For the classical Type I Pareto distribution F (v) = 1 − (v/v)β with
34For expositional clarity, we have stated our results for distributions with finite boundaries. However,
similar results for infinite boundaries hold both for the optimal fee and for asymptotic results in extreme
value theory. The explanation for the lower truncation point v for buyers and upper truncation point c
for sellers has to be slightly different, though. For finite boundary distributions, the simple assumption
of transaction costs is sufficient as an explanation. For infinite boundary distributions, one has to
assume participation costs, which are incurred even if there is no transaction. As an example, a seller
with cost c is not willing to enter if his expected profit without fees maxp(p− c)(1 − F (p)) is less than
his participation cost. See also Appendix C for v 6= c, v 6= c and for participation fees.
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β < −1 (which implies ηd(v) = −β), the fee is proportional to the price, given by (7)
with p∗ = 0. For the Type II Pareto distribution F (v) = 1 − (1 + (v − v)/φ)β, with
β < −1 and φ > 0, the fee is linear and the fixed component positive if and only if
v > φ.35
Taxation of Multiple Markets Suppose there are two markets m = 1, 2, with one
buyer and one seller each. The seller’s cost is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] in both
markets. The buyer’s valuation is distributed Fm(v) = 1 − (1 − v)
βm and support [0, 1]
in m = 1, 2. Assume β1 = 1 and β2 = 2; that is, demand is more elastic in the
second market. Consider an intermediary that maximizes the sum of welfare in the two
markets W 1 +W 2 subject to an overall balanced budget R1 + R2 ≥ 0. Maximizing the
Lagrangian W 1 +W 2 + λ(R1 + R2) yields α∗ = λ∗/(1 + λ∗) ≈ 0.345, which implies fees
ω1α∗(p) ≈ 0.5p − 0.24 and ω
2
α∗(p) ≈ 0.42p− 0.16 and revenues R
1
α∗ ≈ 0.0022 and R
2
α∗ ≈
−0.0022. Revenues collected in the less elastic first market are used to subsidize the
more elastic second market, as conventional wisdom would suggest. However, contrary
to conventional wisdom, fees are higher in the second market for all p ∈ [0, 1).
The interpretation of the asymptotic boundaries of support is somewhat subtle. For
instance, the distribution G(c) = c15 with support [0, 1] implies Γ(c) = (16/15)c and fees
ω1(p) = (p − c)/(σ + 1) ≈ 0.06p. The lower bound of the support c = 0 is necessary to
obtain exact optimality of percentage fees without a fixed component. However, approx-
imate optimality also holds for positive lower bounds. Take for example a distribution
with support [7/15, 1] and the piecewise linear virtual cost function Γˆ(c) = 2c − 7/15
for c ∈ [7/15, 1/2] and Γˆ(c) = (16/15)c for c ∈ [1/2, 1].36 While the virtual cost for
this distribution differs from the one for G(c) = c15 for c < 1/2, the mass of sellers
below 1/2 is negligible: G(1/2) = 2−15 < 0.01 percent. Therefore, a linear approxima-
tion Γ(c) = (16/15)c (corresponding to G(c) = c15 or η
s
(c) = 15) and the implied fee
ω1(p) ≈ 0.06p are close to optimal, even if c = 7/15. A similar reasoning holds for v.
35For Type II Pareto with v < φ and for exponential distributions, the fixed component of the fee is
negative. Results can be obtained by using the virtual valuation functions Φα(v) = v−α/β (exponential)
Φα(v) = v(1 + α/β) (Type I Pareto), and Φα(v) = v(1 + α/β)− (v − φ)α/β (Type II Pareto).
36The corresponding distribution is Gˆ(c) = (15c − 7)2−14 for c ∈ [7/15, 1/2] and Gˆ(c) = c15 for
c ∈ [1/2, 1].
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5 Multilateral Trade
5.1 Auctions
One of the most common forms of multilateral trade observed in practice are auctions
with 1 seller and B buyers, which are run by an auctioneer who charges a commission fee.
This provides a motivation to consider the following mechanism, which adds fees to an
otherwise standard second-price auction. The seller sets a reserve price p. Buyers submit
sealed bids. If at least two buyers submit a bid above the reserve price, the highest bidder
receives the good for a gross transaction price pˆ which is equal to the second highest bid.
If exactly one buyer bids above the reserve price, he gets the good and pays the reserve
price as the gross transaction price pˆ. If no one bids above the reserve price, there is no
transaction. In the case of a transaction, the intermediary charges a fee ωα(pˆ) and the
seller receives the net transaction price pˆ − ωα(pˆ). Call this mechanism a second-price
auction with fees ωα.
Proposition 8. A second-price auction with fees ωα and an arbitrary number B of
buyers, where
ωα(pˆ) = pˆ−Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ pˆ], (11)
induces the seller to set the reserve price Φ−1α (Γα(c)) and implements the α-allocation
rule.
Note that the fee and the reserve price are the same as for bilateral trade. Since the
fee is the same as for the one-buyer case, Propositions 3 and 8 imply that as the fraction
of the most motivated traders that have a positive probability of trade goes to zero, fees
converge to linear fees as stated in (6). All of the comparative statics of the optimal fee
will be the same as for bilateral trade, irrespective of whether the optimal fee is linear.
A natural question to ask is whether revenue equivalence between first- and second-
price auctions carries over to auctions with fees, where the rules of a first-price auction
with fees are the same as those of a second-price auction with fees, except that the winner
pays the highest bid. The following proposition addresses this question.
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Proposition 9. (i) Assume there are B > 1 buyers and let ω(pˆ) be the non-linear fee
for both the first-price and the second-price auction with fees. The two auction formats
with fees will (a) induce the seller to set different reserve prices and (b) lead to different
expected revenues for the intermediary.
(ii) For a linear fee ω(pˆ) = apˆ+ b, a first-price and a second-price auction with fees
will lead to the same reserve price and the same revenues.
An intuition for this result is that the net price pˆ − ω(pˆ) can be seen as the seller’s
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, so that linear fees correspond to auctions
with a risk-neutral seller, while non-linear fees correspond to non-risk-neutrality.
It is worthwhile mentioning that while a first-price and a second-price auction gen-
erate different revenues for a fixed (non-linear) fee function, the same revenue can be
achieved in both auction formats if the fee functions differ for the two auction formats.
For a first-price auction, the fee function has to depend on the number of buyers partic-
ipating. Interestingly, real world auctioneers that charge transaction fees like Sotheby’s,
Christie’s, and eBay use second-price auctions or the strategically equivalent English
auction. Sotheby’s and Christie’s used a fixed 20 percent fee before being caught for
colluding, eBay uses a concave piecewise linear fee function.37
5.2 Slotting Allowances
Real world retailers often require upfront payments by sellers to allocate scarce shelf
space and then charge a fee on the revenue generated by the seller. This procedure
has become known as slotting allowances (see, for example, Marx and Schaffer, 2007,
2010). We now show that slotting allowances can be interpreted as a form of fee-setting
mechanism.
We model slotting allowances as a two-stage procedure with B = 1 buyers and S ≥ 1
sellers. In the first stage, the sellers participate in a second-price auction, bidding for
the right to serve the buyer. The winner pays the second highest bid, provided this bid
37Note that in terms of our theory, only the sum of the fee (also called commission and premium in
the context of auctions) paid by the buyer and the seller matters. The decomposition in the buyer’s
and the seller’s fee is not important.
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is positive, and 0 otherwise. If no seller’s bid is positive, the game ends with payoffs of 0
for every player, including the intermediary. In the second stage, the winner of the first
stage sets a take-it-or-leave-it price offer, facing the fee ω(p) the intermediary announces
at the outset. The fee can also be interpreted as the markup of the retailer.
Proposition 10. Any α-allocation rule can be implemented using slotting allowances
with the fee ωα(p).
For any F and G, ωα(p) will be independent of the number of sellers S. More-
over, if F and G are (mirrored) Generalized Pareto distributions, then ωα(p) will be
linear. However, the expected participation fee, which is determined endogenously via
the second-price auction of the first stage, will increase in S.
5.3 Real Estate Brokers
While our baseline model already provides some insights into real estate brokerage, we
now modify this setup slightly and consider a random matching extension of our mul-
tilateral trade setup, thereby essentially embedding intermediaries in a one-shot version
of the Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) model.
Assume that there is mass B of buyers and mass S of sellers and that each real
estate broker has a local monopoly or that brokers collude, which corresponds to α = 1.
Each broker is matched with at most one seller.38 Buyers choose which seller/broker
pair to visit at random. The number of buyers that visit a seller can then be shown to
follow a Poisson distribution with arrival rate ζ = B/S.39 The transaction price at any
given broker is determined via a second-price auction with fees, which can be seen as a
plausible approximation of the bargaining between the seller and buyers.
We know from our results on auctions with fees that the reserve price set by the
seller and the fee charged by the intermediary are independent of the number of buyers
B. Therefore, neither the reserve price nor the fee will depend on whether the number
38Alternatively, one can assume that the goods in questions are so heterogeneous that the multiple
sellers a broker may attract are from different markets.
39Alternatively, if there is some heterogeneity and a buyer and a seller are a match only with proba-
bility ζ0, then it is ζ = ζ0B/S.
5 MULTILATERAL TRADE 32
of buyers is deterministic or random, nor will they depend on the distributions of the
number of buyers. Therefore, all of the results on auctions with fees carry over to real
estate brokerage, as do the results on the convergence to linear fees and the analysis of
how fees depend on the elasticities of demand and supply.
Proposition 11. (i) For α = 1 and a Poisson arrival rate ζ of buyers, the optimal fee
is the same as in a second-price auction, ω(pˆ) = pˆ− E[Γ−1(Φ(v))|v ≥ pˆ], which induces
the seller to set the reserve price Φ−1(Γ(c)). Both the fee ω and the reserve Φ−1(Γ(c))
are independent of ζ.
(ii) The distribution of the highest valuation is Fˆ (v) := e−ζ(1−F (v)). For the reserve
price p, the probability of selling is 1−Fˆ (p) and the expected transaction price conditional
on trade is
pζ(1− F (p))Fˆ (p) +
∫ v
p
yζ(1− F (y))[Fˆ (y)]′dy
1− Fˆ (p)
. (12)
Both the probability of selling and the expected transaction price conditional on trade are
increasing in ζ.
This random matching model provides insights into a number of relevant questions
in real estate brokerage that appear puzzling from a principal-agent perspective. First,
consider the observation that real estate brokers in the U.S. almost always charge 6
percent of the transaction price as fees and that there is very little variation over time
and across regions.40 This invariance is especially surprising because during booms real
estate prices can be twice as high as during busts (see Hsieh and Moretti, 2003). As
the costs of brokerage seem unlikely to double during booms and drop to original levels
after a boom, brokerage costs cannot explain why brokers’ revenue is proportional to
the average price. Conversely, our model can, provided only that one assumes that
the cyclical variation of real estate prices is due to variations of the ratio of potential
buyers B and potential sellers S, so that during booms the Poisson arrival rate of buyers
ζ = B/S is higher than during busts. A higher arrival rate of buyers leads to a higher
expected transaction price pˆ in the auction but does not affect the fee function ω(pˆ).
40This observation has been made by the Department of Justice (2007) and by Hsieh and Moretti
(2003).
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Moveover, real estate markets are typically thin, so that G is well approximated by a
mirrored Generalized Pareto distribution. This implies that for α = 1, a change of the
buyer’s distribution F would have no effect on the fee.
If we maintain the assumption that variations in ζ are the cause of price differences
in booms and busts, then Proposition 11 (ii) is also consistent with the widely made
observation that during booms prices are high and houses sell easily and during recessions
prices are low and the probability of a house selling is low. It is also consistent with
the empirical observation that in cross-sectional data, houses offered at higher prices are
more difficult to sell.41
Next consider the following empirical observation, made independently by Ruther-
ford, Springer, and Yavas (2005), Levitt and Syverson (2008), and Hendel, Nevo, and
Ortalo-Magne´ (2009): after controlling for the quality of the property, direct sellers –
that is, owners who sell without a broker – receive on average the same or even higher
gross prices than do indirect sellers – that is, owners who sell through a broker.42 We
now show how a simple extension of our model can shed light on this observation. For
simplicity, assume that some sellers have prohibitively high costs of selling directly, ei-
ther because of lack of time or lack of searching and bargaining skills. These sellers
become indirect sellers. Other sellers can sell directly without any additional costs, ei-
ther because they are brokers selling their own homes or because they have the time and
ability to sell their property over a for-sale-by-owner platform efficiently. These sellers
become direct sellers. To allow for a comparison, assume further that the distribution of
costs is the same for potential direct and indirect sellers and that sellers that trade with
probability zero do not bother to enter the market and are hence not observable. Due to
this endogenous entry by sellers, there are two countervailing effects: fees exclude some
of the highest cost indirect sellers who would have entered were they direct sellers, and
an indirect seller with the same cost will set a higher price than will a direct seller.
41See Loertscher and Niedermayer (2012a) for a discussion of these empirical observations.
42In Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magne´ (2009) direct sellers are sellers selling through a for-sale-by-
owner platform. In Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) direct
sellers are brokers selling their own property through the Multiple Listing Service platform. In all
papers, indirect seller are sellers selling through a broker through the Multiple Listing Service.
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Proposition 12. Assume F is Generalized Pareto, α = 1 and that only sellers with a
positive probability of trade enter.
(a) For G mirrored Generalized Pareto, the distributions of reserve prices for direct
and indirect sellers are the same.
(b) Compared to the average reserve price of indirect sellers, the average reserve price
of direct sellers is (i) equal if Γ is linear, (ii) higher if Γ is concave, and (iii) lower if Γ
is convex.
Proposition 12 (a) implies that the distribution of transaction prices (and not just
reserve prices) will also be identical for direct and indirect prices in thin markets; that
is, for Pareto distributions. An argument that is sometimes put forth to account for the
observations by Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005), Levitt and Syverson (2008),
and Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magne´ (2009) is that there is an agency problem because
the 6 percent fees give the brokers insufficient incentive to exert effort for a good price
for the seller. However, this begs the question why such inefficient contracts are used in
practice.43 No such questions arise if the mechanisms employed by real estate brokers are
viewed from an optimal pricing perspective, with the role of choosing the mechanisms
assigned to the brokers, who are the long-run players in the market. From this angle,
linear fee-setting mechanisms arise naturally as optimal mechanisms, and so does the
prediction that there is no price difference among direct and indirect sellers.
A structural estimation based on an infinite horizon dynamic random matching exten-
sion of this setup (Loertscher and Niedermayer, 2012a) shows that linear and percentage
fees are a good approximation of the optimal pricing mechanism.44
43For example, why do the seller and the broker not choose a contract with a steeper incentive scheme?
It is also hard to explain why, when both a buyer’s and the seller’s broker are involved in a transaction,
the commission is split between the two brokers, giving each 3 percent, as a percentage fee paid to the
buyer’s broker gives the broker an incentive to act against the buyer’s interest.
44In a previous version of the current paper (Loertscher and Niedermayer, 2012b), we also considered
an extension of our (somewhat modified) setup to a dynamic random matching model. Dynamics adds
too much complexity, so that an analytical solution is not possible. However, numerical calculations
suggest that results carry over to the more complex dynamic setup.
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5.4 Limit Results and Price Posting
Fee setting with many buyers and sellers For the 〈B, S〉-setup, we now construct
a generalized fee-setting mechanism with uniform pricing for buyers and sellers, which
specializes to the fee-setting mechanism for a second-price auction for S = 1. For simplic-
ity, we confine attention to allocation rules that are strictly monotone in the sense that
qb(vv) and qs(cs) are strictly monotone whenever they are neither 0 nor 1. Let P (c) be
the monotone pricing function that will implement this allocation rule if, in equilibrium,
all sellers set prices according to P (c) and if all buyers bid their values.
This generalized fee-setting mechanism works as follows. The intermediary first an-
nounces a fee function ω(p), which is levied on the uniform transaction price p. Observing
their own cost cs and the fee ω(.), all sellers s ∈ S set prices ps simultaneously, and all
buyers submit their valuations simultaneously.45 Let w be the Walrasian quantity de-
fined with respect to submitted bids by buyers and prices set by sellers. After relabeling
buyers in decreasing order and sellers in increasing order, the uniform transaction price
is p = max{vw+1, pw}, where pw is the w-th lowest price set by a seller and vw+1 is the
(w+1)th highest bid by a buyer. Notice that buyers will have a weakly dominant strat-
egy to bid truthfully, which is already reflected in this notation. If w ≥ B, let vw+1 = v.
The sets of buyers and sellers who trade are given by the Walrasian sets. All buyers who
trade pay p while all other buyers pay 0 and all sellers who trade receive p− ω(p) while
all other sellers receive 0. All that remains is to derive the fee function ω(p) that induces
sellers of type c to set the price P (c) for c ∈ [c, P−1(v)] and an arbitrary price no less
than v for any c > P−1(v).
Let q(p) := qs(P
−1(p)) be the probability that a seller who sets the price p trades
under the fee-setting mechanism that implements the allocation rule P (c) when setting
the price p and when every other seller s sets the price according to ps = P (cs) and every
buyer plays his weakly dominant strategy. Further, define a(p) :=
∫ p
1
q′(y)
q(y)−(1−H(y))
dy,
where H is the distribution of the Walrasian price. The formal expressions for q(p) and
H are provided in the proof in the appendix.
45It does not matter whether buyers observe the prices (p1, .., pS) before submitting their bids.
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Proposition 13. With B buyers and S sellers, the allocation rule P (c) can be imple-
mented via a generalized fee-setting mechanism with the fee
ω(p) = ea(v)−a(p)(v − P−1(v))−
∫ v
p
ea(y)−a(p)[1 + (y − P−1(y)]a′(y)dy. (13)
It is not hard to verify that for B ≥ S = 1, (13) specializes to the by now familiar
expression ω(p) = p− Ev[P
−1(v)|v ≥ p].
Price Posting A mechanism that is widely used in practice, particularly in thick
markets, and that is also useful for our theoretical analysis of fees, is price posting.
Formally, the price posting mechanism is defined as follows. Let B and S be the finite
numbers of buyers and sellers. The intermediary announces a buyer price pB and a seller
price pS, which are such that every buyer who trades pays pB and every seller who sells
receives pS. Let nB and nS be the number of buyers and sellers that are willing to trade
at those prices. The number of trades that occur at the posted prices pB and pS is
n := min{nB, nS}, with agents on the long side being rationed randomly.
Our first result is a negative one:
Proposition 14. Assume B = S = 1 and consider an intermediary who is restricted
to set an ask price pB and a bid price pS. The weighted sum of welfare and profit
under price posting is maximized by prices satisfying the equation system Φα(p
B) =
αpS + (1−α)Ec[c|c ≤ p
S] and Γα(p
S) = αpB + (1−α)Ev[v|v ≥ p
B]. Price posting is not
optimal.
For two uniform distributions F and G with support [0, 1], prices are pB = 1 −
2/(3(α + 1)) and pS = 2/(3(α + 1)). It is easy to verify, for example, that for α = 1,
the expected revenue with these posted prices is 1/27, which is lower than the revenue
of 1/24 generated by a fee-setting mechanism with the fee ω1.
The reason price posting is not optimal is that it implements a different allocation
than the optimal α-allocation: it does not allow for flexibility of the transaction price
for different realizations of v and c.46 By the same reasoning as for bilateral trade, price
posting is not optimal for any finite number of buyers and sellers.
46For example, the threshold for v above which a buyer trades, pB, is independent of the realization
of c, whereas for the optimal allocation rule, Pα(c) does depend on c.
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However, as the number of buyers and sellers goes to infinity, price posting converges
to optimality. To see this, consider a K-fold replica of the 〈B, S〉 economy, keeping the
ratio ζ = B/S fixed. We have the following positive result.
Proposition 15. Let prices be given by the system of equations Φα(p
B) = Γα(p
S) and
ζ(1 − F (pB)) = G(pS). As K goes to infinity, (i) the optimal mechanism converges to
a price-posting mechanism with these prices and (ii) the price-posting mechanism with
these prices converges to optimality.
For two uniform distributions F and G on [0, 1] and ζ = 1, prices are pB = 1 −
1/(2(1 + α)) and pS = 1/(2(1 + α)).
The driving force behind this result is that it becomes unnecessary to condition on the
realized distribution of (v, c), since uncertainty about the realized distribution vanishes
in the limit. Note that this result also extends to a setup in which an intermediary meets
one buyer and one seller at a time with an infinite time horizon and where the good can
be stored without cost.47 It is also interesting to note that intermediaries that use price
posting – for example, used car dealers and currency exchange offices – either have large
numbers of traders or store the good.
We now return to optimal fees for the 〈B, S〉-setup, while letting B and S go to
infinity, keeping ζ fixed. Here, the intermediary can charge the bid-ask spread given by
price posting in Proposition 15 as a fee, ω(pB) = pB − pS. For prices p 6= pB the fee has
to be such that a seller does not have an interest in setting a price different from pB.
This implies the same allocation rule and the same payments as for price posting, which
we know is optimal for infinite B and S.
6 Conclusions
We study fee-setting mechanisms within a fairly general model of market making. Fee-
setting mechanisms are used by real-estate brokers around the globe, by auction houses
47Storeability of the good means that the intermediary can consider all buyers and sellers as present
at the same time and by Proposition 15 price posting is optimal. This proposition is in line with the
prevalence of price posting in thick markets and in markets with storable goods. The assumption that
there is a large number of traders is particularly relevant for standardized or storable commodities.
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and auction sites on the world wide web, and by governments in most developed countries
to generate tax revenue via indirect taxation.
Our pricing based model ascribes the central role of choosing the trading mechanism
to the intermediaries who make the market. The model’s predictions are consistent with
a number of observations in various markets including real-estate brokerage, auction
houses, retailers with slotting allowances, and used car dealers. We show that linear
fees are optimal in increasingly thin markets because thin markets are characterized by
(mirrored) Generalized Pareto distributions on the demand and supply side. It is hoped
that these results will prove fruitful for future applied work, given the host of results
from statistics for this family of distributions.
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Online Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) We first show that for any incentive-compatible mechanism
(Q,T ) that satisfies interim individual rationality and gives zero utility to the most
inefficient types, the revenue of the intermediary is
R = Ev,c
[∑
b∈B
Φ(vb)Qb(v, c)−
∑
s∈S
Γ(cs)Qs(v, c)
]
−
∑
b∈B
Ub(v)−
∑
s∈S
Us(c), (14)
where Ub(vb) := vbqb(vb)− tb(vb) and Us(cs) := ts(cs)− csqs(cs), is a buyer’s and a seller’s
utility if they report their types truthfully. By a standard envelope theorem argument,
incentive compatibility implies
Ub(vb) = Ub(v) +
∫ vb
vb
qb(y)dy and Us(cs) = Us(c) +
∫ c
cs
qs(y)dy,
see for example Krishna (2002, chapter 5). Thus, every agent’s expected payoff at the
interim stage (that is, after learning his type and expected payment and the probability
conditional on this type but nothing more) is pinned down, up to a constant, which is
Ub(v) if he is a buyer and Us(c) if he is a seller, by the allocation rule. Since the integral
terms are non-negative, interim individual rationality is satisfied if and only if Ub(v) ≥ 0
and Us(c) ≥ 0. Using the definitions Ub(vb) and Us(cs) and assuming that the least
efficient types – v and c – never trade, the expected payment from a buyer of type vb
and the expected payment to a seller of type cs are
tb(vb) = tb(v) + vbqb(vb)−
∫ vb
vb
qb(y)dy,
ts(cs) = ts(c) + csqs(cs)−
∫ c
cs
qs(y)dy.
Changing the order of integration in the resulting double integral and making use of the
assumption that types are independent, the ex ante expected transfer from a buyer b,
denoted Evb [tb(vb)], is
Evb [tb(vb)] = tb(v) +
∫ v
v
Φ(y)qb(y)f(y)dy,
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where vb inside Evb [.] denotes a random variable. Similarly, the ex ante expected transfer
to a seller s, denoted E[ts(cs)], can be expressed as
Ecs[ts(cs)] = ts(c) +
∫ c
c
Γ(y)qs(y)g(y)dy.
Therefore, ex ante expected revenue R of the mechanism (Q,T ) is
R = Ev,c
[∑
b∈B
Φ(vb)Qb(v, c)−
∑
s∈S
Γ(cs)Qs(v, c)
]
−
∑
b∈B
Ub(v)−
∑
s∈S
Us(c). (15)
Since R =
∑
Evb [tb(vb)] −
∑
Ecs[ts(cs)] and Ub(v) = tb(v) and Us(c) = ts(c). The
expression in the proposition follows from using (15) in (1− α)W + αR.
(b) Individual rationality requires Ub(v) ≥ 0 and Us(c) ≥ 0 for all b and s. Ub(v) =
Us(c) = 0 for all b and s ensure that this constraint is just satisfied. Further, since the
α-allocation rule maximizes
∑
bΦα(vb)Q
α
b (v, c)−
∑
s Γα(cs)Q
α
s (v, c) for every realizaton
of (v, c), it also maximizes its expected value (1− α)W + αR.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Φ continuously differentiable implies
lim
v→v
d
dv
[
1− F (v)
f(v)
]
= lim
v→v
d
dv
[v − Φ(v)] = β, (16)
for some constant β. Equation (16) is the von Mises condition as stated in Theorem 2
in Appendix B. It implies that F is in the domain of attraction of an extreme value
distribution (as defined in Definition 2) by Theorem 2. By the Pickands-Balkema-de
Haan theorem (see Theorem 1), this in turn implies that F has a Generalized Pareto
upper tail as defined in (31). This implies convergence of the normalized distribution
F˜k to F˜
∗(v˜) = 1 − (1 − v˜)β, because of the definition of the normalized variable v˜. An
analogous reasoning holds for the convergence of G˜k.
(ii) Define
β¯ := lim
v→v
1− Φ′(v) and σ¯ := lim
c→c
Γ′(c)− 1,
β := −1/β, and σ := 1/σ. Observe that by l’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
v→v
(v − v)f(v)
1− F (v)
= lim
v→v
v − v
v − Φ(v)
= lim
v→v
−1
1− Φ′(v)
= β. (17)
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First, we show that linearity of fees holds for the denormalized limiting distributions
F ∗ and G∗. For simplicity, denote the supports of the denormalized limiting distributions
as [v, v] and [c, c]. The distributions are hence F ∗(v) = 1 − [(v − v)/(v − v)]β and
G∗(c) = [(c− c)/(c− c)]σ. Virtual type functions are linear, Φ∗α(v) = v− (v− v)α/β and
Γ∗α(c) = c+ (c− c)α/σ. Fees given in (2) can be rearranged the following way.
ω∗(p) = p− Ev[Γ
∗−1
α (Φ
∗
α(v))|v ≥ p]
= p− Ev[Γ
∗−1
α (αΦ
∗(v) + (1− α)Φ∗−1(Φ(v)))|v ≥ p]
= p− Γ∗−1α (αEv[Φ
∗(v)|v ≥ p] + (1− α)Φ∗−1(Ev[Φ
∗(v)|v ≥ p]))
= p− Γ∗−1α (αp+ (1− α)Φ
∗−1(p)),
where the first equality comes from the definition of Φα(v) = αΦ(v) + (1 − α)v =
αΦ(v) + (1− α)Φ−1(Φ(v)), the second equality from the linearity of Γ∗α and Φ
∗, and the
third from (1). Plugging in the functional forms for Γ∗α and Φ
∗ yields
ω(p) = α(p− c)
[
1
α + σ
]
− (1− α)(v − p)
[
σ
(α+ σ)(β + 1)
]
,
which implies that (5) holds for the limiting distributions F ∗ and G∗, because of the
definitions of ω˜ and p˜.
Next, we want to show convergence to linearity. For this, it is useful to consider a
linear transformation of the original problem, such that the length of the support is 1 for
both F and G, and the lower bound is 0. This can be done without loss of generality.
Formally, the support of the seller’s distribution [ck, (vk − ck)/u
S
k + ck] is transformed
to [0, 1] and the support of the buyer’s distribution becomes [vk − (vk − ck)/u
B
k , vk] to
[uk − 1, uk] with some uk > 0. Note that as k → ∞, uk → 0. In part of the following
analysis, we will drop the subscript k and simply write u→ 0.
This has the advantage that the transformed distributions are only shifted and not
stretched compared to F and G. Call these transformed distributions Fˆk and Gˆk, with
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Gˆk(cˆ) = G(cˆ) and Fˆk(vˆ) = F (vˆ + (1− u)). The transformed fee is
ωˆ(pˆ) = upˆ+
∫ 1
pˆ
Γˆ−1α (Φˆα(uvˆ))ufˆ(uvˆ)dvˆ
1− Fˆ (upˆ)
= upˆ+
[
1− Fˆ (upˆ)
1− Fˆ (u)
]
−1 ∫ 1
pˆ
Γˆ−1α (Φˆα(uvˆ))
1
1− vˆ
u(1− vˆ)f(uvˆ)
1− Fˆ (uvˆ)
1− Fˆ (uvˆ)
1− Fˆ (u)
dvˆ,
where the first expression comes from plugging in upˆ for p in (2) and the second expression
is obtained by multiplying by (1 − Fˆ (u))/(1 − Fˆ (u)), (1 − Fˆ (uvˆ))/(1 − Fˆ (uvˆ)), and
(1− vˆ)/(1− vˆ).
By Theorem 1, we know that[
1− Fˆ (upˆ)
1− Fˆ (u)
]
−1
=
[
1− F (1− u(1− pˆ))
1− F (1− u)
]
−1
→ (1− pˆ)−β,
as u→ 0.
As a next step, we need to show that the integrand uniformly converges to the
expression given by the limiting distributions. Uniform converges of the integrand then
implies convergence of the integral.
Again, by Theorem 1 [
1− Fˆ (upˆ)
1− Fˆ (u)
]
u→0
⇒ (1− vˆ)β ,
where the double arrow ⇒ stands for uniform convergence.
u(1− vˆ)fˆ(uvˆ)
1− Fˆ (uvˆ)
=
(1− vˆ)uf(1− u(1− vˆ)
1− F (1− u(1− vˆ))
=
(1− v′)f(v′)
1− F (v′)
,
where v′ = 1− u(1− vˆ). As u→ 0, v′ → 1 for arbitrary vˆ, which implies that the above
expression goes to β by (17).
By the definition of β we have
lim
u→0
∂
∂(uvˆ)
[
1− Fˆ (uvˆ)
fˆ(uvˆ)
]
= lim
v′→1
[
1− F (v′)
f(v′)
]
′
=
1
β
.
This implies that
1
u
[
1− Fˆ (uvˆ)
f(uvˆ)
]
u→0
⇒
vˆ
β
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and hence
1
u
Φˆα(uvˆ)
u→0
⇒ vˆ − α
1− vˆ
β
By a similar logic
1
u
Γˆα(ucˆ)
u→0
⇒ cˆ
(
1 +
α
σ
)
and hence
1
u
Γˆ−1α (ux)
u→0
⇒
x
1 + α/σ
,
because uniform convergence of a function implies uniform convergence of its inverse (see
for example Barvinek, Daler, and Francu (1991)).
Since both Φˆα and Γˆ
−1
α uniformly converge to the functions implied by the limiting
distributions, so does their combination.
Taken together, one can see that the integrand uniformly converges to the function
implied by the limiting distributions. This implies convergence of the integral, which in
turn implies convergence of the fees to linear fees.
Proof of Lemma 1. First take the convex hulls. Since Γ ≤ Γ and convex, we have Γ−1 ≥
Γ and Γ−1 concave. The same reasoning applies to Γ−1α and Φ
−1.
Therefore, p−Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p] = p−Ev[Γ
−1
α (αΦ(v)+(1−α)Φ
−1(Φ(v))|v ≥ p] is
bounded from below by p−Ev[Γ
−1
α (αΦ(v)+(1−α)Φ
−1(Φ(v))|v ≥ p]. Now take the chain
of equalities that led from ω(p) to p − Γ−1α (αp + (1 − α)Φ
−1(p)) above. Whenever the
linearity of Φ and Γ is used to take the expectations into a function, use the concavity of
Φ−1 and Γ−1 and Jensen’s inequality. This results in a chain of inequalities that shows
that ω(p) ≥ p − Γ−1α (αp + (1 − α)Φ
−1(p)). The same reasoning applies to the concave
hulls and the upper bound.
Proof of Proposition 4. For α = 0, Φα(v) = v and Γα(c). Hence
ωα(p) = p−Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p] = p−Ev[v|v ≥ p].
Equation (9) is obtained by plugging α = 0 into (8).
(ii) Note that
Γα(c) = c
(
1 +
α
ηs(c)
)
.
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Therefore, ηˆs > ηs implies Γˆα(c) < Γα(c) for all c, which in turn implies Γˆ
−1
α (x) > Γ
−1
α (x)
for all x. Thus,
ωˆα(p) = p−Ev[Γˆ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p] ≤ p−Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p] = ωα(p)
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Equation (10) is obtained by plugging α = 1 into (8). For G
mirrored Generalized Pareto, Γ is linear. Hence the lower bound and the upper bound
coincide: ω1(p) = p− Γ
−1(p).
(ii) By the reasoning in Lemma 1, ωα has the lower and upper bounds
p− Γα(αp+ (1− α)Ev[v|v ≥ p]) ≤ ωα(p) ≤ p− Γα(αp+ (1− α)Ev[v|v ≥ p]), (18)
and similarly for vˆ and Fˆ . ηˆd(p) > ηd(p) for all p ∈ [v, v] implies
fˆ(p)
1− Fˆ (p)
≥
f(p)
1− F (p)
,
for all p, that is, hazard rate dominance. Hazard rate dominance implies Evˆ[vˆ|vˆ ≥
p] ≥ Ev[v|v ≥ p] for all p. Combining this with (18) gives the first statement in the
proposition. For G Pareto, the boundaries in (18) are tight, that is,
ωα(p) = p− Γα(αp+ (1− α)Ev[v|v ≥ p]),
which implies the second statement in the proposition by the above reasoning.
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Since
Φα(v) = v − α
1− F (v)
f(v)
, Γα(c) = c+ α
G(c)
g(c)
,
Φα decreases and Γα increases as α increases. Therefore, an increase of α decreases
Γ−1α (Φα(v)) for all v, and hence increases
ωα(p) = p− Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p]
for all p, which proves the statement.
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(ii) Note that
ω′α(p) =
∂
∂p
[
p− Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p]
]
can be rearranged to
ω′α(p) = 1−
f(p)
1− F (p)
[
Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p]− Γ
−1
α (Φα(p))
]
= 1 +
f(p)
1− F (p)
[
Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(p))− Γ
−1
α (Φα(v))|v ≥ p]
]
.
Therefore, ∂ω′α(p)/∂α has the same sign as
∂Ev[Γ
−1
α (Φα(p))− Γ
−1
α (Φ(v))|v ≥ p]
∂α
,
which is positive if
∂2Γ−1α (Φα(v))
∂α∂v
< 0, (19)
for all v. This and the analogous results for positive and zero cross-derivatives in (19)
prove the statement.
Proof of Proposition 7. As ηd increases, Φα(v) = v(1 − α/ηd(v)) increases. Therefore,
Φ−1α (Γα(c)) decreases. As ηs increases, Γα(c) = c(1 + α/ηs(c)) decreases and so does
Φ−1α (Γα(c)). As α decreases, Φα increases and Γα decreases. Therefore, Φ
−1
α (Γα(c))
decreases.
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 1 we know that for one seller and B buyers the
optimal allocation rule is to allow trade if and only if maxBb=1Φα(vb) ≥ Γα(c). The second-
price auction with ωα fees implements this allocation rule for the following reason. A
buyer has the incentive to bid his own valuation by a standard (Vickrey) dominant
strategies argument. The highest bid maxb vb will be greater than or equal to the reserve
price Φ−1α (Γα(c)) if and only if maxbΦα(vb) ≥ Γα(c). Therefore, the auction implements
the optimal allocation rule. It only remains to be shown that the seller has the incentive
to set the reserve price Φ−1α (Γα(c)).
The profit of the seller in a second-price auction is
(p− ωα(p)− c)(1− F (p))BF (p)
B−1 +
∫ v
p
(y − ωα(y)− c)(1− F (y))B
[
F (y)B−1
]
′
dy,
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where the first term is the seller’s profit if the reserve price p is binding (that is, exactly
one buyer is above the reserve price) and the second term – the integral – is the profit if
the reserve price is not binding (that is, at least two buyers are above the reserve price).
The profit is the same as in a standard auction (see, for example, Krishna (2002, p. 25)),
except for the fee ωα(·). The seller’s first order condition with respect to p simplifies to
[(p− ωα(p)− c)(1− F (p))]
′BF (p)B−1 = 0.
Since BF (p)B−1 is always positive, the first-order condition simplifies further to [(p −
ωα(p) − c)(1 − F (p))]
′ = 0, which is the same as in the case with one buyer. We know
that for the one-buyer case, the seller’s optimal reserve price is Φ−1α (Γα(c)). Further,
since the mechanism gives zero utility to the most inefficient agents c and v, it is an
optimal mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) The net transaction price pˆ− ω(pˆ) received by the seller can
be reinterpreted as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Non-linear fees imply
a non-linear net price, which corresponds to a non-risk-neutral seller. A non-risk-neutral
seller will set a reserve price that depends on the number of buyers in a first-price auction
(for a proof see Hu, Matthews, and Zou (2010)). Since we know that for a second-price
auction the reserve price is independent of the number of buyers, the reserve price has
to differ in a first-price auction compared to in a second-price auction. Different reserve
prices lead to different revenues.
(ii) A linear net transaction price corresponds to a risk-neutral seller. It is a well-
known result in auction theory that for risk-neutral sellers, a first-price and a second-price
auction generate the same expected revenues (see Myerson (1981) or Krishna (2002)).
The seller also sets the same reserve price in both auction formats. Further, since the fee
is linear, the two auction formats generate the same revenue for the intermediary.
Proof of Proposition 10. We know that setting p = Pα(c) is the unique optimal price
for any seller-type who trades with positive probability in the second stage. In the first
stage, every seller has a dominant strategy to place a bid equal to his expected profit of
participating in the second stage, given cost c and ωα(p). Since these profits are strictly
A PROOFS 49
decreasing in costs, the seller with the lowest cost wins in the first stage. Thus, the
mechanism implements the α-allocation rule.
Proof of Proposition 11. (i) This is a straightforward implication of Proposition 8: since
the fee and the reserve price are independent of the number of buyers B, they are also
independent of the random arrival rate of buyers ζ .
(ii) The probability mass function of the Poisson distributed number of buyers B is
e−ζζB
B!
.
Observe that for a fixed number of buyers B, the highest valuation follows the distribution
F (v)B. Taking expectations over B yields
∞∑
B=0
e−ζζB
B!
F (v)B = e−ζ(1−F (v)). (20)
Therefore, the probability of selling is 1− e−ζ(1−F (p)). Further, observe that
∞∑
B=1
e−ζζB
B!
BF (p)B−1 = ζ
∞∑
B=1
e−ζζB−1
(B − 1)!
F (p)B−1 = ζe−ζ(1−F (p)), (21)
where the second equality follows from (20). The expected revenue in a second-price
auction with a fixed number of buyers B is
p(1− F (p))BF (p)B−1 +
∫ v
p
y(1− F (y))[BF (y)B−1]′dy,
see, for example, Krishna (2002, p. 25). Taking expectations over B yields
p(1− F (p))
[
∞∑
B=1
e−ζζB
B!
BF (p)B−1
]
+
∫ v
p
y(1− F (y))
[
∞∑
B=1
e−ζζB
B!
BF (y)B−1
]
′
dy
= p(1− F (p))ζe−ζ(1−F (p)) +
∫ v
p
y(1− F (y))[ζe−ζ(1−F (y))]′dy,
by (21). The expected transaction price is the expected revenue divided by the proba-
bility of selling, which leads to (12).
Further, the cumulative distribution function of the number of buyers
∑B
i=0 e
−ζζ i/i!
decreases in ζ . Therefore, a distribution of buyers with a higher arrival rate ζ first-order
stochastically dominates a distribution with a lower ζ . Since both the probability of
trade and the expected transaction price increase in B, they also increase in ζ .
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Proof of Proposition 12. (a) For F and G Pareto, Φ and Γ are linear. Since the price of
both the direct seller Φ−1(c) and the indirect seller Φ−1(Γ(c)) are linear functions of c,
the distributions of reserve prices have to be mirrored Generalized Pareto for both direct
and indirect sellers with shape parameter σ. Further, the highest price set is v for both
direct and indirect sellers. The lowest price set by direct sellers is Φ−1(c) and by indirect
sellers Φ−1(Γ(c)) = Φ−1(c), which is again the same. Having the same lower and upper
bound and shape parameter, the distributions of the reserve prices of direct and indirect
sellers are identical.
(b) Direct sellers set the price Φ−1(c) (see Myerson (1981)) and enter if c ≤ v = c.
Indirect sellers set the price Φ−1(Γ(c)) (see Corollary 1) and enter if c ≤ Γ−1(Φ(v)) =
Γ−1(v) = Γ−1(c). Therefore, average prices of direct and indirect sellers are PDA =
Ec[Φ
−1(c)] and P IA = Ec[Φ
−1(Γ(c))|c ≤ Γ−1(c)]. Using the linearity of Φ and (1), prices
can be rewritten as PDA = Φ
−1(Ec[c]) and P
I
A = Φ
−1(Γ−1(c)). Since Φ and Γ are in-
creasing, PDA ≥ P
I
A is equivalent to Γ(Ec[c]) ≥ c. This implies the statement because of
Ec[Γ(c)] = c by (1) and Jensen’s inequality.
Proof of Proposition 13. The profit of seller j when of type cj ∈ [c, P
−1(v)] and when
setting price pj, given ω(p) and given that every other seller sets the price according to
P (c), can be written as
Πj(pj, cj) = Pr(pj = p)[pj − ω(pj)] + Pr(pj < p)[Ep[p− ω(p)|p > pj] + (1− Pr(pj ≤ p))cj
= [q(pj)− (1−H(pj))][pj − ω(pj)] +
∫ v
pj
[p− ω(p)]dH(p) + (1− q(pj))cj ,
where q(pj) := qs(P
−1(pj)) is the probability that the seller of type cj = P
−1(pj) trades
and H(p) is the cumulative distribution function of p. The probability q(ps) is q(ps) =
S−1∑
j=0

 S − 1
j

 Gj(P−1(ps))(1−G(P−1(ps)))S−1−j B∑
i=j+1

 B
i

FB−i(ps)(1− F (ps))i.
As will be shown below, what matters for the fee function is the probability q(ps)− (1−
H(ps)) rather than H(ps). This probability is q(ps)− (1−H(ps)) =
S−1∑
j=0

 S − 1
j

 Gj(P−1(ps))(1−G(P−1(ps)))S−1−j

 B
j + 1

FB−(j+1)(ps)(1− F (ps))j+1.
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The first-order condition for seller j’s problem is
q′(pj)[pj − ω(pj)− cj ] + [q(pj)− (1−H(pj))][1− ω
′(pj)] = 0. (22)
Defining
a(p) :=
∫ p
1
q′(y)
q(y)− (1−H(y))
dy (23)
and substituting P−1(pj) = cj , one can re-write (22) as
ω′(pj) + ω(pj)a
′(pj) = 1 + [pj − P
−1(pj)]a
′(pj). (24)
The boundary condition for this differential equation is that a seller of type P−1(v) makes
zero profit even if he sold a unit (which will happen with probability 0); that is,
v − ω(v)− P−1(v) = 0. (25)
The unique solution to the differential equation (24), subject to the boundary condition
(25), is the expression in (13).
Proof of Proposition 14. In the case that trade occurs, the weighted average of the in-
termediary’s revenue and agents’ utility is α(pB − pS) + (1− α)(v− c). Integrating over
the area in which trade occurs yields∫ pS
c
∫ v
pB
[
α(pB − pS) + (1− α)(v − c)
]
dF (v)dG(c). (26)
The first-order condition with respect to pS, ∂(αR+(1−α)W )/∂pS = 0, yields after some
algebra G(pS)f(pB)[−Γα(p
S) +αpS + (1−α)Ev[v|v ≥ p
S]] = 0. Similarly, the first-order
condition with respect to pB yields (1 − F (pB))g(pS)[−Γα(p
S) + αpB + (1 − α)E[v|v ≥
pB]] = 0. This proves the first part of the statement. The second part – that price
posting is not optimal – follows from the fact that for the optimal α-allocation rule the
trading threshold for the buyer, v ≥ Φ−1α (Γα(c)), depends on c, whereas for price posting,
v ≥ pB, it does not.
Proof of Proposition 15. (i) For a finite number of buyers and sellers a dominant strategy
implementation of the α-allocation rule is optimal: everyone reports their valuations and
costs. Every buyer who trades pays max{vw+1,Φ
−1
α (Γα(cw))}, where w is the Walrasian
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quantity defined with respect to the α-allocation rule. Every seller who trades receives
min{cw+1,Γ
−1
α (Φα(vw))}.
The valuation of the marginal trading and non-trading buyers and the marginal
seller’s cost plus the spread charged by the intermediary converge in probability to the
same value, which we denote as pB:
plim
K→∞
vw = plim
K→∞
vw+1 = plim
K→∞
Φ−1α (Γα(cw)) =: p
B. (27)
Similarly,
plim
K→∞
cw = plim
K→∞
cw+1 = plim
K→∞
Γ−1α (Φα(vw)) =: p
S. (28)
For the fraction of buyers and sellers who trade we have
plim
K→∞
w
KB
= plim
K→∞
max{i|vi ≥ p
B}
KB
= 1− F (pB), (29)
plim
K→∞
w
KS
= plim
K→∞
max{i|ci ≥ p
S}
KS
= G(pS). (30)
(27), (28), (29), and (30) imply that the optimal mechanism converges to price posting
with pB and pS that satisfy Φα(p
B) = Γα(p
S) and ζ(1− F (pB)) = G(pS).
(ii) Define nB := max{i|vi ≥ p
B} and nS := max{i|ci ≤ p
S} as the number of buyers
and sellers willing to trade under the price posting mechanism. As Φα(p
B) = Γα(p
S),
plim
K→∞
nB
KB
= 1− F (pB) = G(pS) = plim
K→∞
nS
KS
.
Further, since ζ(1 − F (pB)) = G(pS), we have Φα(vnB) ≥ Φα(p
B) = Γα(p
S) ≥ Γα(cnS)
and by analogy Φ(vnB+1) < Γ(cnS+1). Therefore, the fraction of traded quantity is in the
limit
plim
K→∞
min{nB, nS}
Kmin{B, S}
=
max{i|Φ(vi) ≥ Γ(ci)}
Kmin{B, S}
def
=
w
Kmin{B, S}
,
which is the fraction of the Walrasian quantity defined with respect to the α-allocation
rule.
B Extreme Value Theory
This appendix gives a brief review of extreme value theory. The theory of exceedences
within extreme value theory deals with the distribution of a random variable conditional
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on being above a high threshold (for the original articles see Balkema and De Haan
(1974), Pickands (1975); for a textbook see Falk, Hu¨sler, and Reiss (2010)). The theory
relates to the fact that one often observes that the upper tail of a distribution is well
approximated by a Generalized Pareto distribution.
The general principle behind this observation is described by the Pickands-Balkema-
de Haan theorem (also called the second theorem of extreme value theory). For exposi-
tional simplicity, we provide a simplified version of the theorem, since it is sufficient for
our purposes. See Pickands (1975, Theorem 7) and Balkema and De Haan (1974) for
the theorem itself. The theorem establishes a connection between the behavior of the
maximum of a distribution and its upper tail. The relevant concept for the maximum is
the domain of attraction:
Definition 2. A distribution F is in the domain of attraction of an extreme value
distribution if there exists a sequence of constants an > 0 and bn real for n = 1, 2, ...,
such that
lim
n→∞
F n(anx+ bn) = Fmax(x)
for every continuity point x of F
max
for some nondegenerate distribution function F
max
(see De Haan and Ferreira, 2006, p. 4).
This means that for n independently and identically distributed random variables,
(max{X1, X2, ..., Xn} − bn)/an has a nondegenerate distribution as n goes to infinity.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. (Simplified version of the Pickands-Balkema-de Haan Theorem) Assume
F has a finite upper bound and f(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (v, v). Then F has a Generalized
Pareto upper tail, formally
lim
u→0
1−
1− F (v − u(v − v))
1− F (v − u(v − v))
= 1−
(
v − v
v − v
)β
, (31)
for some constant β, where convergence is uniform, if and only if F is in the domain of
attraction of an extreme value distribution.
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The left-hand side of (31) is the rescaled distribution conditional on being above the
threshold v − u(v − v). The right-hand side is the cumulative distribution function of a
finite upper bound Generalized Pareto distribution.
Proof of Theorem 1. See Theorem 7 in Pickands (1975). Note that for our setup (v finite
and f(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (v, v)) the definition of F having a Generalized Pareto upper
tail given in Definition 4 in Pickands (1975) simplifies to (31).
The literature on extreme value theory states several sufficient conditions for a dis-
tribution to be in the domain of attraction of an extreme value distribution. We state
the one most suitable for our purposes.
Theorem 2. Assume F has a finite upper bound. F is in the domain of attraction of
an extreme value distribution if the von Mises condition
lim
v→v
d
dv
[
1− F (v)
f(v)
]
= β, (32)
for some constant β, holds.
Proof. See, for example, Theorem 1.1.8 in De Haan and Ferreira (2006, p. 15).
As stated in the literature, even this sufficient condition is weak and is satisfied by all
“textbook” continuous distributions, such as uniform, Beta, bounded Generalized Pareto,
inverse Weibull and (for the infinite upper bound counterpart of the condition) the
normal, exponential, Cauchy, and infinite upper bound Generalized Pareto distribution.
Often, the Generalized Pareto distribution is defined with the parametrization
F ∗(v) = 1−
(
1 +
ξ(v − µ)
σ
)
−1/ξ
.
For ξ < 0 the distribution has a finite upper bound and corresponds to the parametriza-
tion used in this paper with v = µ, v = µ − σ/ξ, and β = −1/ξ. For ξ ≥ 0, it has an
infinite upper bound and lower bound µ. One obtains the exponential distribution as
a special case as limξ→0 F
∗(v) = 1 − e−(v−µ)/σ . For ξ > 0 and σ = µξ one obtains the
classical Type I Pareto distribution F (v) = 1− (µ/v)1/ξ. For ξ > 0 one obtains the Type
II Pareto distribution.
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For infinite upper bounds, convergence can be stated as(
1−
1− F (u+ x)
1− F (u)
)
− F ∗u (x)
u→∞
→ 0,
for some Generalized Pareto distribution F ∗u . See the abovementioned references for more
details.
Note that the characteristic property of Generalized Pareto distributions is that the
inverse hazard rate is linear: [(1 − F (v))/f(v)]′ = ξ. The special cases can be seen as
the inverse hazard rate decreasing (bounded Generalized Pareto distribution), constant
(exponential distribution), and increasing ((Non-Generalized) Pareto distribution). ξ <
0 corresponds to the common monotone hazard rate condition (that is, f(v)/(1− F (v))
is increasing). ξ < 1 corresponds to Myerson’s regularity condition Φ′(v) > 0 and is also
necessary to ensure that the distribution has a finite mean.
C The General Mechanism Design Problem
In the main text we have focused on the regular case in which Φα and Γα are increasing
and F and G have the same support, that is v = c and v = c. We have also focused on
allocation rules that are strictly monotone for all types that do not trade with probability
0 or 1. In this appendix we show that results hold with some slight modifications if we
drop these assumptions.
First, consider v 6= c and/or v 6= c. If Φα(v) ≤ Γα(c) and Φα(v) ≤ Γα(c) (which is
satisfied for v = c and v = c as assumed in the main text), then results hold without
modification. This is because the most inefficient traders – a buyer with valuation v
and a seller with cost c – trade with probability zero and hence receive utility zero in a
fee-setting mechanism.
Before deriving the optimal fee for the cases in which Φα(v) > Γα(c), Φα(v) > Γα(c),
Φα(v) decreasing for some v, or Γα(c) decreasing for some c, we introduce more general
definitions of virtual valuation functions and inverses.
Define the ironed virtual valuation and virtual cost, denoted respectively as Φα,iron
and Γα,iron, by following the procedure in Myerson (1981, p.68). That is, for a buyer,
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define
Jb,α(q) := conv
∫ q
0
Φα(F
−1(r))dr,
where conv stands for the convex hull of a function. The ironed virtual valuation function
of the buyer can now be defined as Φα,iron(v) = J
′
b,α(F (v)). Wherever Φ
iron
α is strictly
increasing, Φα,iron(v) = Φα(v).
For the seller, construct the ironed virtual cost function in a similar way by defining
Js,α(q) := conv
∫ q
0
Γα(G
−1(r))dr,
and the ironed virtual cost function as Γα,iron(c) = J
′
s,α(G(c)).
Lemma 2. In the general setup (in which Myerson’s regularity assumption may not
hold), it is optimal for the intermediary to allow trade if and only if Φα,iron(v) ≥ Γα,iron(c)
and to give zero utility to the most inefficient traders.
Proof. By the same logic as Myerson (1981)’s theorem on p. 69 and Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983).
The easiest way to derive the optimal fee is by the following brief detour through the
dominant strategy implementation of the optimal allocation rule. Similar to Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983, p.280), we can implement the allocation rule with dominant
strategies in the general case by letting the buyer pay Pα,gen(c) := Φ
−1
α,gen(Γα,iron(c)) and
the seller receive P−1α,gen(v) := Γ
−1
α,gen(Φα,iron(v)) in the case of trade. Here, gen stands for
general and the generalized inverses are defined as
Φ−1α,gen(x) := min{v|v ≥ v and Φα,iron(v) ≥ x},
Γ−1α,gen(x) := max{c|c ≤ c and Γα,iron(c) ≤ x}.
Without trade, both get 0. We can now use the same logic as in the main text to derive
the optimal fee-setting mechanism. The dominant strategy implementation already gives
the right price for the buyer, Pα,gen(c). To ensure that the seller’s payment only depends
on c, we have to consider the expectation of P−1α,gen(v), which he gets in the dominant
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strategy implementation. The net price the seller receives is Ev[P
−1
α,gen(v)|v ≥ Pα,gen(c)],
since we have to take expectations conditional on trade taking place. The optimal fee is
the gross minus the net price, in the indirect mechanism representation. Using p rather
than Pgen(c), this is
ωα,gen(p) = p−Ev[P
−1
α,gen(v)|v ≥ p]
for p ≤ v and any ωα,gen(p) ≥ v − p for p > v. This is the same as in the main text,
except that we are using ironed virtual valuations.
The generalized inverses cover the case Φα(v) > Γα(c), since the price Pα,gen(c) set by
the seller ensures that the price is never below v, which ensures that the most inefficient
buyer v has zero utility. The inverse Φ−1α in the main text represented the solution of
the first-order condition, assuming that there is an inner solution, the generalized inverse
Φ−1α,gen handles boundary solutions.
If Φα,iron(v) > Γα,iron(c),
48 the most inefficient seller c could obtain the positive profit
(p − ωα,gen(p) − c)(1 − F (p)), where p = Pα,gen(c). To correct for this, the optimal fee
has to be chosen as
ωα,gen(p) = p−Ev[P
−1
α,gen(v)|v ≥ p]+
{
1− F (Pα,gen(c))
1− F (Pα,gen(c))
(
E[P−1α,gen(v)|v ≥ Pα,gen(c)]− c
)}
,
(33)
where the expression in brackets ensures that sellers of type c have no informational
rents; that is ts(c)−cqs(c) = 0. The price paid by the buyer, Pα,gen(c) is a left-continuous
function (the discontinuities, if any, being determined by the discontinuities of Φ−1α,iron)
with horizontal intervals where Γα,iron is horizontal. The inverse P
−1
α,gen(v) is a right
continuous function (the discontinuities, if any, arising due to Γ−1α,iron) with horizontal
intervals where Φα,iron is horizontal.
The fee in (33) relies only on charging a transaction fee. Another possible implemen-
tation is to charge the simple transaction fee ωα,gen(p) = p − Ev[P
−1
α,gen(v)|v ≥ p] and
charge an additional participation fee (1 − F (Pα,gen(c)))(E[P
−1
α,gen(v)|v ≥ Pα,gen(c)] − c)
to the seller, which ensures that the most inefficient seller receives zero utility.
48This can be the case, for example, if v > c and if α small enough. Recall that v > c is one of
the necessary conditions for the possibility result for ex post efficient trade of Makowski and Mezzetti
(1993).
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Finally, we provide the proof of part (a) of Proposition 2.
Proof of part (a) of Proposition 2. From the revelation principle we know that no mech-
anism can implement Q if it is not incentive-compatible. Thus we are left to show that
a fee-setting mechanism can implement any incentive-compatible Q. From the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem (see, for example, Krishna (2002)) we know that Q is incentive-
compatible if and only if qb(v) is nondecreasing and qs(c) is nonincreasing.
Let the correspondence aQ, which maps from [c, c] to [v, v], be the boundary in
(v, c)-space of the allocation rule Q, such that Qb(v, c) = Qs(v, c) = 1 if and only if
v ≥ aQ(c). Whenever aQ is single-valued, then it is non-decreasing if Q is incentive-
compatible. Let P : [c, c]→ [v, v] be the left-continuous function that has a discontinuity
at every point at which aQ is multi-valued and whose graph coincides with the graph
of aQ wherever aQ is single-valued. Let P
−1
gen(x) := max{c ≤ c and P (c) ≤ x} be the
generalized inverse. Note that a fee-setting mechanism implements Q if it is such that
a seller of type c = P−1gen(p) optimally sets the price p. Thus, we are left to show that
such a fee-setting mechanism exists. Let ωgen(p) = p − Ev[P
−1
gen(v)|v ≥ p] be the fee
the intermediary charges. In this case, the seller of type c who sets the price p has
an expected profit of (p − ωgen(p) − c)(1 − F (p)) =
∫ v
p
(P−1gen(v) − c)f(v)dv. The first
derivative with respect to p is −(P−1gen(p) − c)f(p). Hence, the first-order condition is
satisfied at P−1gen(p) = c, or equivalently at p = P (c). Moreover, because P
−1
gen(·) is a
weakly increasing function, the second-order condition is satisfied weakly whenever the
first-order condition is, proving that the seller’s profit function is quasiconcave.
